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“CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS”:
A DIALECTIC ON NEGATIVE
AND POSITIVE LIBERTY IN
HATE-SPEECH CASES
W. BRADLEY WENDEL*
I
INTRODUCTION
The following conversation between a civil libertarian and a new-left First
Amendment theorist occurred as part of the ABA’s conference on the present
and future of the Bill of Rights.  The discussion was precipitated by the case of
Matthew Hale, a white supremacist who—to put it mildly—likes to attract me-
dia attention.  He set himself up as the leader of a racist “church” called the
World Church of the Creator, and immediately went about attempting to put an
articulate, polite face on the organization, much in the way that David Duke
tried to appear less threatening during his run for Congress in Louisiana.  But
there is only so much window-dressing that Hale can do, since he is obviously a
rabid racist.  His website contains numerous exhortations to “racial loyalty” and
“racial holy war”; shopworn canards about blacks, Jews, and other ethnic mi-
norities (called the “mud races” by Hale); a bizarre theology based on the “Six-
teen Commandments” and vehement denunciations of Christianity; long-
discredited bogus biological theories about racial differences; and a boilerplate
disclaimer that the group does not condone violence.1  Hale’s little corner of cy-
berspace is representative of a burgeoning number of websites maintained by
white supremacists and other hate groups.2  The World Church of the Creator
site alone contains links to dozens of other racist sites,3 including those main-
tained by the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, the American Nazi Party, and the
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1. World Church of the Creator, at http://www.rahowa.com (last visited October 12, 2001).  “Ra-
howa” is Hale’s acronym for “racial holy war.”
2. E.g., Michel Marriot, Rising Tide: Sites Born of Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1999, at G1; Pam
Belluck, Hate Groups Seeking Broader Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 7, 1999, at A16.
3. World Church of the Creator, at http://www.rahowa.com/links.htm (last visited October 12,
2001).
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White Aryan Resistance.  But Hale and his organization have certainly estab-
lished a higher profile than other hate groups on the Internet, particularly with
their efforts to market racism to children with a kids’ website featuring white-
supremacist games and puzzles—fun for the whole family!4
Hale also happens to be a graduate of Southern Illinois University Law
School.  Because of the publicity he had managed to attract, Hale’s application
to become a licensed attorney in Illinois was a media event, and the decision of
the character and fitness committee of the Illinois Supreme Court, declining to
certify his fitness for admission, generated immediate controversy.5  Alan Der-
showitz offered to represent Hale in his challenge to this order, an offer which,
as far as I know, was not taken up.6  Hale petitioned for review by the Illinois
Supreme Court. He was denied,7 and he then petitioned for certiorari in the
U.S. Supreme Court, which he was again denied.8
The Hale case is important not only to lawyers who represent unpopular
applicants for admission to practice law.  It has broader significance as a test
case for much of the recent theorizing about the application of the First
Amendment to hateful expression.  Hale’s application to practice law also pro-
vides a wonderful illustration of how the new left critique of the First Amend-
ment would play out in practice, since the Illinois bar committee swallowed the
new left position hook, line, and sinker.  The committee emphasized the consti-
tutional values of racial equality and human dignity that were threatened by
Hale’s asserted expressive liberties and concluded that the value of equality
must supersede the value of free speech.9  This is exactly what some of the new
left critics had been urging courts to do in hate-speech cases.10  For example,
4. World Church of the Creator Kids!, at http://www.wcotc.com/kids (last visited October 12,
2001). Activities include games like word scrambles (representative question: “cniioetxtn—Hint: This is
what the White Race faces if we don’t save it”) and crossword puzzles (sample clue: “_____ races are
races that are not white”).  The white supremacist organization “Stormfront” also has a kids’ page,
maintained by the twelve-year-old son of Stormfront’s founder.  See Stormfront White Pride World
Wide, at http://www.stormfront.org (last visited October 12, 2001).
5. The full name of the body which initially denied Hale’s application is the Committee on Char-
acter and Fitness for the Third Appellate District of the Supreme Court of Illinois (Inquiry Panel).  The
Inquiry Panel’s decision is reprinted in GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
LAWYERING 875 (3d ed. 1999).  For convenience I will refer to the version of the Inquiry Panel’s opin-
ion included in the Hazard casebook, using that book’s pagination [hereinafter Hale Inq. Panel Op.].
The Inquiry Panel’s decision was affirmed on a narrower ground by a Hearing Panel of the Character
and Fitness Committee.  That decision is reprinted in the Teacher’s Manual to the Hazard casebook,
but is not otherwise readily available to the public.
6. Bob Van Voris, Muddying the Waters: Illinois Racist’s Free Speech Case is Complicated by His
Arrest Record, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 21, 2000, at A1 (quoting Dershowitz); a St. Louis attorney, Robert
Herman, also offered to represent Hale.  George Anastaplo, Lawyers, First Principles, and Contempo-
rary Challenges: Explorations, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 353, 356-57 (1999) (reporting that a Jewish civil
rights lawyer—a “true believer” in the First Amendment—had also offered to represent Hale).
7. Illinois Supreme Court Minute Order, M.R. 16075 (Nov. 12, 1999) (on file with author).
8. Hale v. Comm. on Character and Fitness of the Illinois Bar, 530 U.S. 1261(2000).
9. Hale Inq. Panel Op., supra note 5, at 881-82.
10. E.g., Brief of Amici Curiae National Black Women’s Health Project in Support of Respondent,
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), reprinted in 2 HATE SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION:
THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE: RECONCILING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND EQUALITY OF
CITIZENSHIP 197 (Steven J. Heyman ed., 1996).
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Mari Matsuda, one of the pioneers of the critical race theory movement and the
new left critique of the First Amendment, has suggested carving out an admit-
tedly content-based, sui generis category of racist speech that can be regulated
by the state.11  Charles Lawrence, another scholar of central importance to the
progressive critics, proposes a more realistic, less categorical jurisprudence, in
which constitutional values of racial equality and human dignity are given pride
of place alongside the expressive liberties secured by the First Amendment.12
Again, this is precisely the suggestion adopted by the Illinois bar committee,
which balanced the free-speech rights asserted by Hale against the equality in-
terests his admission would threaten, and found Hale’s claims wanting.
The controversy that led up to the Hale bar-admission case also is one of the
more prominent examples of “cyber-hate,” a much-feared consequence of the
rapid expansion of the Internet.  There is little doubt that the case would not
have attracted so much attention without Hale’s enthusiastic embrace of tech-
nology.  In the 1990s, the danger posed by racist speech seemed to loom larger
in light of the unknown impact the Internet would have on the recruiting and
message-dissemination efforts of white-supremacist groups.  As it has turned
out, the effectiveness of websites has been less than many had predicted, al-
though e-mail and discussion groups still serve as communications and recruit-
ing tools for hate groups.13  (The Internet also has not been the boon for civil
liberties that some had forecasted.  It has become a heavily regulated medium,
like any other.14)  For a short period of time, however, it appeared that the ef-
fects of hate speech would spread like wildfire beyond the geographic bounda-
ries of the bigot’s community into the wide-open realm of “cyberspace,” a term
that also began to crop up in First Amendment scholarship around this time.
As computer networks continue to proliferate in the new millennium, we can
expect new controversies over the peculiarities of the new medium as compared
with other media, like newspapers, radio, and television, which have created
wrinkles in free speech doctrine.15  At the present time, however, the Internet
has not warranted its own version of Red Lion, a decision that modified the
regulatory structure of the news media to accommodate the limited nature of
the television broadcast spectrum.16  Certainly the Hale case does not appear to
be the vehicle for reconceptualizing the regulation of cyberspace, as distinct
from media such as newspapers, billboards, and pamphlets.  The Illinois bar
11. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2320, 2357 (1989).
12. Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990
DUKE L.J. 431.
13. Southern Poverty Law Center, Reevaluating the Net, INTELLIGENCE REP., Summer 2001, at 54.
14. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 TEX. L. REV. 447 (2000) (book review).
15. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
16. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and the Clinton Admini-
stration, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 302 (2000) (“[T]he words ‘in cyberspace’ in the phrase ‘re-
strictions on free speech in cyberspace’ are generally, in my view, not terribly significant; the medium
by and large does not and should not affect the protection—or lack of protection—given to the con-
tent.”).
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committee did not attach special significance to the fact that Hale’s messages of
hate were communicated on a website, instead of via leaflets or signs.17  Because
he would have remained only a local nuisance, however, the committee may not
have perceived the need to make a political statement by denying his applica-
tion.
I chose to write this essay in dialogue form for several reasons:  First, the
format is an homage to the innovative methodology of some of the new left
critics of First Amendment scholarship.  There is considerable overlap between
the new left critics and members of the critical race theory and feminist legal
theory movements who have pioneered methods like first-person narratives and
fictional conversations.18  These methods, and the controversy they have
sparked, are part of the story of recent First Amendment scholarship.19  Second,
this format captures the evolutionary nature of constitutional theory.  The past
two decades have witnessed the rise of the new left challenge to classic civil lib-
ertarian views about expressive liberties, particularly where hate speech is in-
volved.  The battle lines between civil libertarians and new left critics are be-
coming clearer, but no new settled position or new orthodoxy has emerged from
the debate.  Finally, the format of this essay reflects my belief that this is not a
debate that can easily be settled.  The civil libertarian and new left positions are
grounded in conceptions of political morality that are fundamentally incom-
patible—negative and positive liberty, as the great historian of ideas Isaiah
Berlin has termed them.20  In light of the ongoing controversy in political theory
over these two concepts of liberty, I thought it inappropriate here to write a
dogmatic defense of either position.  My hope is to present the opposing argu-
ments as sympathetically as possible and let the reader decide which is the more
persuasive.
17. Ironically, Hale’s group seems comfortable with traditional media as well.  His organization
recently threatened an interracial couple with death by placing fliers into the Thrifty Nickel, a classi-
fied-ads newspaper that was distributed free at local stores.  The flier denounced the “wedding of the
blond White woman with the mongrel Filipino animal savage” and announced that “such actions must
be punished by DEATH.”  Southern Poverty Law Center, For Hale, a Wedding Worthy of Death,
INTELLIGENCE REP., Fall 2000, at 2.
18. E.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1992); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); the long-running Rodrigo Chronicles by Richard Delgado,
beginning with Rodrigo’s [First] Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357 (1992) (book review); and Matsuda, su-
pra note 11.  Although dialogues and narrative are often associated with critical-race scholars, others
have used this form to good effect.  One of the best recent examples is Arthur Isak Applbaum, Profes-
sional Detachment: The Executioner of Paris, 109 HARV. L. REV. 458 (1995).  Two of Lon Fuller’s clas-
sic works of jurisprudence are in the form of fictional narratives. Lon L. Fuller, The Problem of the
Grudge Informer, in THE MORALITY OF LAW app. at 245 (rev. ed. 1969); Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the
Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949).
19. For critiques, some more sympathetic than others, of nontraditional forms of scholarship see,
e.g., Richard A. Posner, Nuance, Narrative, and Empathy in Critical Race Theory, in OVERCOMING
LAW 368 (1995); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay on Legal
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993); Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989).
20. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ESSAYS 191 (Henry
Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., Chatto & Windus 1997).  For convenience, I refer to page numbers in
the version of the essay reproduced in Proper Study of Mankind and Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of
Liberty (1958), reprinted in ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969).
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One downside of the dialogue form is that most law professors are not very
good playwrights, so these theoretical essays dressed up as conversations do not
exactly read like Mamet.  Doctrinal analysis in the form of fictionalized chit-
chat is also terribly artificial and tedious, like plot exposition as dialogue in a
bad screenplay.  There is not much I can do about these problems, except to
stress that I am writing not for dramatic impact, but as a way to play two com-
peting lines of argument against each other.  (Unlike Derrick Bell and Richard
Delgado,21 I am not concerned with creating believable fictional characters; the
“speakers” here are just vehicles for presenting theoretical arguments.)  Also,
because I am assuming some familiarity with the hate-speech debate, I have
tried to avoid lengthy exposition of the legal principles.  My ambition here is to
use this format to create something like a Hegelian dialectic, pushing the debate
gradually deeper to reveal the political and theoretical assumptions of both
sides, which are ultimately the thesis and antithesis of contemporary First
Amendment theory.  By setting out the history of free speech law in these
terms, perhaps we can see the way clearly to a synthesis for the new millennium.
Of course, if the reader judges one of the protagonists to have decisively refuted
her opponent’s arguments, then we have a thesis only, and are still awaiting an
antithesis.
Another problem with writing a history of the hate-speech debate in the
form of a dialogue is that it can be difficult to follow the argument as it moves
from the doctrinal level through increasing degrees of theoretical complexity.  I
have tried to alleviate this problem somewhat by providing occasional headings
where the discussion changes direction.  But in order to take maximum advan-
tage of the freedom offered by the dialogue format to roam widely through the
practical and theoretical issues raised by this case, I do not adhere rigidly to
these rough subject-matter divisions.  Finally, in order to preserve some degree
of narrative continuity, I do not begin with some of the classic arguments that
each protagonist might be expected to mention.  Some readers, for example,
may be struck by the fact that the civil libertarian does not mention the state ac-
tion doctrine (or the public/private distinction) until significantly later in the
discussion.22  I hope that considerations of readability justify deferring some of
these doctrinal arguments to a natural place in the conversation.
The new left and civil libertarian arguments in this essay are amalgamations
and are not intended to represent the views of any particular person.  The civil
libertarian position is so familiar that it practically writes itself, and I do not be-
lieve there will be much disagreement with the way it is formulated (as opposed
to its correctness).23  What I refer to as the new left critic’s arguments are an-
21. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 167-173 and accompanying text.
23. For some representative civil libertarian contributions to the recent debates on hate speech and
pornography, see Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 225 (1992); Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words In-
crease Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 333 (1991); Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV.
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other matter entirely.  The group of scholars associated with progressive re-
sponses to civil libertarianism are quite diverse in their methodology, ideology,
allegiances, and arguments, although there are, of course, broad areas of
agreement.  There is also, as mentioned above, much affinity between the new
left critique of the standard civil libertarian First Amendment theory and allied
movements such as critical legal studies, feminist legal theory, postmodernism,
and especially critical race theory and outsider legal scholarship, although there
are important differences among these groups.24  Some of the arguments below
are influenced more by these general theoretical positions than by any argu-
ment specific to free speech issues.  I have also tried to show linkages between
the new left critique and more familiar jurisprudential positions, not to slight
the contribution of outsider scholars to the development of the critique,25 but to
show that although new left scholars are sometimes denounced as radicals, they
have anchored their arguments in some deep objections to political liberalism
that should be taken quite seriously.  As a result of my method of bricolage, the
arguments of the new left critic in this paper will probably not satisfy any actual
member of this loosely defined group.26  That is as it should be, because the re-
sponse to the well-entrenched civil libertarian viewpoint is still evolving, which
makes the subject of hate-speech a good one for reviewing the recent history of
the First Amendment and speculating about its future in the next millennium.
The new left critic’s arguments in this paper should be viewed as my idiosyn-
cratic synthesis of diverse jurisprudential viewpoints, not as an attempt to essen-
tialize any single scholar’s or movement’s position into the canonical statement
of the progressive position.
We pick up with the civil libertarian (“CL”) and the new left (“NL”) critic
talking about the Hale case.
II
THE HALE CASE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
CL: Sounds like a no-brainer to me.  The committee got it wrong and the
courts were wrong to deny review.  The state’s decision to deny Matthew
193 (1996); Gary Goodpaster, Equality and Free Speech: The Case Against Substantive Equality, 82
IOWA L. REV. 645 (1997).
24. The split between critical legal studies and critical race theory over the issue of rights is a sig-
nificant and well-known example.  See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.  I also tend to rely
more on critical race theory than feminist legal theory in formulating the new left position because the
case under discussion involves racist expression.  I do not intend to slight the contribution of feminist
critics such as Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, who have contributed powerful critiques of
conventional First Amendment theory in the context of pornography and sexual harassment.  Because
of the focus on the Hale case, however, I cannot spend too much time on the feminist arguments.
25. Cf. Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How To Marginalize Outsider Writing,
Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992).
26. And they may all object strenously to being supported by Ronald Dworkin!  See infra notes
108-24 and accompanying text.  Nevertheless, I believe there are significant unappreciated affinites be-
tween Dworkin’s jurisprudence and some of the progressive critiques of the First Amendment.  I do not
suggest that any particular progressive scholars actually endorse these arguments.
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Hale a law license is a viewpoint-based restriction on expressive liberties.
It is trying to punish him for having unpopular beliefs or saying things
that offend some people.  What possible basis does the state have for re-
jecting his application?
NL: Another no-brainer.  Courts permit state bar associations (exercising
their delegated powers27) to screen bar applicants for moral character.
The standard is usually something like “the present ability and disposi-
tion of the applicant to practice law competently and honestly.”28  The
Hale case sounds outrageous only to someone who is unfamiliar with the
pervasive regulation of lawyers’ character that is a part of all states’ bar-
admissions procedures.  Applicants are denied permission to sit for the
bar exam every day on the basis of conduct far less harmful than Hale’s
hatemongering.  If an applicant’s record reveals evidence of alcohol de-
pendency, defaulting on student loans, lots of traffic tickets, academic
dishonesty, or even impulse-control problems, forget about it.  That per-
son will not be permitted to sit for the bar.29  As a matter of constitutional
law, how do you analyze those cases?  Surely they are examples of view-
point-based discrimination.
27. The bewildering variety of lawyers’ professional associations can make it difficult to locate the
state action necessary for an issue of constitutional law to arise.  The court of last resort in a given state
has the inherent power to regulate the practice of law by lawyers in that jurisdiction, and the state’s
highest court therefore has the authority to admit lawyers to practice and to administer a system of dis-
cipline for lawyers.  (New York has, by statute, vested this authority in its four Appellate Divisions.  See
JUDICIARY LAW, NY CLS Jud § 90 (2001).)  Many bar associations are formally nothing more than
trade associations, although numerous states have so-called “mandatory,” “integrated,” or “unified”
bars, meaning that every lawyer who practices in that jurisdiction is required to belong to the bar asso-
ciation.  Membership in the bar is made mandatory by order of the state’s highest court.  State bar asso-
ciations and grievance committees exercise delegated powers originating with the state court, and are
usually empowered to adopt rules governing lawyers’ conduct, investigate allegations of misconduct,
hold hearings, and make recommendations for appropriate discipline to the state court.  See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmts. c, d (2000); ABA/BNA
LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 201:101-03; CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS §§ 2.2-2.3 (practitioner’s ed. 1986).  Thus, in a case where a character and fitness com-
mittee of State X recommends against admission of a candidate, the denial of admission becomes a
state action when it is approved by the state’s highest court.  In many, if not most, states this is a rub-
ber-stamp procedure, so the decision is made for all practical purposes at the bar association level, even
though it does not take on the character of state action until that decision is ratified by the court.
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 2 cmt. d (2000).
29. E.g., In re Gossage, 5 P.3d 186 (Cal. 2000) (convicted murderer with a subsequent pattern of
traffic and parking conviction); In re Mustafa, 631 A.2d 45 (D.C. 1993) (mishandling moot court funds);
In re C.R.W., 481 S.E.2d 511 (Ga. 1997) (applicant defaulted on student loans and had filed two previ-
ous petitions for bankruptcy); In re Charles M., 545 A.2d 7 (Md. 1988) (lying in a deposition as a lay
witness); In re Kapel, 651 N.E.2d 955 (Ohio 1995) (repeated traffic violations and psychiatric treatment
for impulse control problems); In re Simmons, 584 N.E.2d 1159 (Ohio 1992) (misappropriation of funds
from student organization); In re Roots, 762 A.2d 1161 (R.I. 2000) (applicant with convictions for
shoplifting and resisting arrest, who had also published articles indicating “explicit racial and ethnic
bias”); Unglaub v. Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 979 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. App. 1998) (applicant with history of al-
cohol abuse, but four years sober in AA; also had fallen behind on student loan payments); Frasher v.
Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 408 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1991) (applicant had three DUI convictions and 24
speeding tickets).
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CL: I thought the practice of screening out bar applicants for their “moral
character” ended with the loyalty-oath cases.30  Isn’t it true that the state
can’t ask an applicant questions like “are you or have you ever been a
Communist”?
NL: Yes and no.  You’d be surprised what the Supreme Court didn’t decide in
those cases.  It is true that a state cannot refuse to admit an applicant who
refuses to disclose membership in “subversive” organizations.31  On the
other hand, the Court has permitted states to deny admission to a pro-
spective lawyer who belonged to an organization that advocated violent
overthrow of the United States where the applicant shared that specific
intent.  Moreover, the Court has permitted states to deny admission
where the applicant refused to answer questions about whether he had
that intent.32  Some states, like New York, continue to ask questions
about membership in these organizations and sharing intent to use vio-
lent means against the government.33  I realize that these decisions are
old, and that circumstances have changed.  Justice Ginsburg has said that
intervening cases, as well as the end of the Cold War, have cast doubt on
the precedential value of the bar-admissions opinions, particularly since
those cases were decided by a badly fractured Court.34  Until the Court
overrules these decisions, however, they stand, and they provide a basis
for denying admission to Hale.
CL: What basis?  Those decisions weren’t exactly the Court’s finest hour.  It
will probably overrule them if it gets a chance, and they’ll be consigned to
the dustbin of First Amendment jurisprudence, joining all of those now-
discredited opinions upholding convictions of Eugene Debs and antiwar
protesters.35  Anyway, Hale has never admitted that he intends to commit
illegal acts.  In fact, he has said that he will work nonviolently within the
legal system to bring about change,36 albeit change for the worse.
NL: Of course Hale can’t be convicted of a crime for being a racist—unfortu-
nately!  But state bar associations make predictive judgments all the time
concerning the potential that an applicant will be able to conduct himself
or herself as a lawyer should.  I’ll give you an example that happened
30. E.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258
(1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Beilan v. Bd. of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
31. Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36
(1961); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
32. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 164-66 (1971).
33. Colin A. Fieman, A Relic of McCarthyism: Question 21 of the Application for Admission to the
New York Bar, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 47, 48 (1994).
34. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Supreme Court Discourse on the Good Behavior of Lawyers: Leeway
Within Limits, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 183, 189 (1996).
35. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
36. Hale Inq. Panel Op., supra note 5, at 876.
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right around the time of the Hale case.  Picture this: A law student makes
himself a gigantic pain in the neck for three years.37  He writes letters to
local newspapers about school governance, puts up a nude photograph in
his library carrel and threatens to sue when the school asks him to take it
down, publicly accuses the dean of incompetence and corruption, files
ethics complaints against the dean, writes stories about “corruption” in
the university’s health plan for the student newspaper, and, for his mas-
terstroke, prints and sells “Deanie on a Weenie” T-shirts depicting a cari-
cature of the dean “astride what appears to be a large hot dog.” 38
CL: Perfect!  That’s exactly what lawyers are supposed to do.  Investigating
corruption, speaking out against an arrogant and distant administration,
challenging the school to live up to its principles by precipitating a First
Amendment battle over the nude photograph—that’s great!  “Deanie on
a Weenie” may be juvenile, but it’s certainly an effective form of protest.
We need more lawyers like him.  He was admitted, I take it.
NL: No, actually.  The Nebraska Supreme Court unanimously upheld the
state bar commission’s recommendation that he be denied admission.
CL: That’s outrageous!
NL: It’s not out of line with the way lawyers’ constitutional arguments are
generally treated by courts.  Remember that lawyers are “officers of the
court” who have responsibility for conforming the conduct of individuals
to the law.39 Sometimes the Supreme Court goes so far as to say that the
ethical obligation of a lawyer is to ensure the reliability of the adversary
system, not to interfere with its operation.40  That’s a rather statist vision
of lawyering, I admit.  But even some fairly libertarian Court decisions
involving the law governing lawyers take pains to emphasize that the role
of the lawyer is all about bringing clients into compliance with the law.41
There’s a connection between the rule of law and the role of lawyers that
just doesn’t exist for other kinds of private speakers.
III
THE ILLINOIS BAR COMMITTEE’S ADOPTION OF THE NEW LEFT’S REASONING
CL: How does respecting the rule of law or being an officer of the court sup-
port denying admission to Matthew Hale?  He has said that he will abide
by all relevant substantive and procedural rules in his work as a lawyer.
37. In re Converse, 602 N.W.2d 500 (Neb. 1999).
38. Id. at 503-04.
39. E.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1056; 1075 (1991); In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d
394, 397 (Minn. 1987); Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Exam’rs, 421 P.2d 76, 87 (Cal. 1966).
40. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
41. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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NL: He refuses to accept the fundamental constitutional value of racial
equality.42 There’s no way he can work as a lawyer within our legal system
if he refuses to acknowledge this principle.  The Illinois Inquiry Panel
simply resisted the First Amendment fetishism that courts seem unable to
avoid and concluded that some fundamental constitutional values can be
preferred to expressive liberties in some contexts.43  There are also equal-
ity values in the Constitution which are conveniently forgotten whenever
the First Amendment is invoked.  As for prospective lawyers, if they are
not committed to a vision of professionalism that encompasses racial
equality, it is better that we deny them admission at the outset.
CL: This is getting scary!  If you permit the state to deny Hale a law license
because he is a racist, you are allowing the government to function as the
Thought Police.  If you have good beliefs, you can be a lawyer; bad be-
liefs, you’re out.  Look, it’s easy when it’s a scuzzball like Matthew Hale.
But think about all the other beliefs that are at odds with constitutional
principles. Despite all the efforts of Scalia, Rehnquist, and friends, a
woman still has a constitutional right to an abortion.  Does that mean
that a committed anti-abortion activist cannot become a lawyer because
he or she does not assent to the “fundamental truth” of the right to
choose?  Or think about the death penalty.  There are plenty of lawyers
out there who believe the system of capital punishment is immoral and
they are spending their careers resisting it.  Would you deny them admis-
sion to the bar?  Remember that anti-death-penalty arguments by law-
yers aren’t exactly favored in this political climate.  The Supreme Court
has been cutting back on habeas corpus for years, and Congress went
even farther in 1996 with AEDPA.44 At some point, if it hasn’t happened
already, there will be a fundamental truth established that fast-tracked
executions are a bedrock of our legal system.  This isn’t hypothetical.
Remember, Senator McCarthy’s crusade was also based on the incom-
patibility between Communism and the “fundamental truths” inherent in
the American Constitution.
The whole point of the First Amendment is that the government doesn’t
get to choose up sides.  You know the line from Barnette, “if there is any
fixed star in the constitutional horizon it is that the government cannot
prescribe what is orthodox in matters of belief.”45  It can’t define “bad”
42. Hale Inq. Panel Opin., supra note 5, at 881.
43. Id. at 882.  The Hale case is not the first time a connection has been suggested between racism
and the character and fitness requirement for sitting for the bar.  The faculty of a state law school re-
sponded to racist slurs that had appeared on school chalkboards by issuing a statement warning stu-
dents that “racist, sexist, homophobic and anti-lesbian, ageist, and ethnically derogatory statements”
might be construed as evidence that the student lacked “sufficient moral character to be admitted to
the practice of law.”  Matsuda, supra note 11, at 2370 n.248.
44. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
45. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).  The full quotation is: “If there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
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vs. “good” ideas and go around rewarding people who have good beliefs
and punish those with bad beliefs.
NL: The state isn’t seeking to regulate bad beliefs.  It is denying a law license
to a lawyer who has false beliefs about the value of racial equality in our
legal system.  In a case like that, the government can take sides, the dic-
tum in Barnette notwithstanding.  The state could fire a teacher who
taught his geography class that the earth is flat, right?  Or take a more
controversial example.  Could a school district mandate the teaching of
evolution instead of “creation science” and fire a teacher who refused to
comply with that guideline?  I think you would say yes.46  And remember
all of the government-speech cases where an employer is permitted to
fire an employee whose speech is inconsistent with the employer’s mis-
sion.  Unless the employee is speaking out on a matter of public concern,
she can be fired for substantially interfering with a government function,47
even if the “interference” is just publicly criticizing her employer.48
The government-employee speech cases are reinforced by the selective-
funding cases, like Rust v. Sullivan,49 which make it clear that the gov-
ernment can take a position on some issues.  Think about it: The gov-
ernment can fund a public education campaign that says, “Wear your
seatbelt,” or “Quit smoking now,” or “Don’t have unprotected sex.”  It
doesn’t have to remain agnostic in public about whether or not wearing a
seatbelt is a good idea.  It can also, when setting up a judicial system, de-
cide that rules of evidence are better than trial by ordeal.  So why should
the government, when it licenses lawyers, have to remain agnostic about
whether lawyers can make it their life’s work to harm people of color?
CL: I will grant you that the Court has held that there’s nothing unconstitu-
tional about funding decent but not indecent art, for example;50 however,
I think that decision is wrong, just as I thought Rust was wrong.  But
those cases are totally off point here.  Matthew Hale is not a mouthpiece
for the government.  If anything, his role as a lawyer, if he could ever be-
come one, ought to be understood as oppositional.  We wouldn’t want
him to take the party line, so to speak, and for that reason this situation is
nothing like the government-employee or selective-funding cases.  Even
though funding isn’t an issue here, I think the practice of licensing law-
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein.”  Id. at 642.
46. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853
(1982).
47. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151 (1983) (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168
(1974)).
48. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 681-82 (1994).
49. 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding Health Department regulations limiting the ability of Title X
fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities).
50. Nat’l Endowment of the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572-73 (1998).
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yers is like a state university handing out money to student organizations.
The Court in Rosenberger said that, if a government entity makes finan-
cial assistance widely available to diverse speakers, it can’t discriminate
based on content in its allocation of funds.51  You can think of a license to
practice law as “support” of some kind for expressive activities—here,
the activity of taking a  position on a legal issue.
Lawyers are different from the examples you cite.  Lawyers are not state
employees or conduits for government messages.  They’re private actors,
hired by individuals, who oppose the state in many cases.52  That’s what
Charles Fried meant when he referred to the lawyer as the client’s spe-
cial-purpose friend,53 and it’s an axiom of legal ethics that lawyers must be
independent from state control so they can challenge the exercise of state
power.54  The Supreme Court has taken this position, too, in cases like
NAACP v. Button,55 which reversed a Virginia Supreme Court decision
holding that civil-rights lawyers had violated state rules on unlawful so-
licitation of clients by meeting with concerned parents to explain the
ramifications of the Brown v. Board of Education56 decision and to offer
to represent local plaintiffs in school-desegregation litigation.  And, more
recently, it distinguished the activities of government-funded legal aid
lawyers from the medical advice given by doctors in Rust,57 on the basis of
the importance of an independent bar to the rule of law.58  The Court
specifically noted that the legal services funding program was “designed
to facilitate private speech, not to promote a governmental message.”59  If
government-funded lawyers are intended to facilitate private speech, I
just cannot see how a truly private lawyer, such as Matthew Hale intends
to become, is more subject to content-based restrictions on his speech.
Even if the state thinks racial equality is a good thing and wants to fund
public-education campaigns to stamp out racism, it still has to permit
racists to be lawyers (and lawyers to be racists).  That’s important be-
cause we do not want the state to declare a set of ideas off-limits to its
51. Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995).  See also Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
52. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (holding that public defenders are not state
actors for the purpose of a federal civil-rights statute).
53. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85
YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
54. E.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1990); Robert W.
Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988); John Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts
Are Where You Find Them: A Response to Professor Subin’s Position on the Criminal Lawyer’s “Dif-
ferent Mission”, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 339 (1987).
55. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).  See also United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971);
United Mine Workers v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia,
377 U.S. 1 (1964).
56. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
57. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
58. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
59. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001).
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citizens.  Individuals should have the liberty to think thoughts that the
government doesn’t like.
The abuse of liberty I’m worried about is not imaginary.  Governments
do not take kindly to speech at odds with their official beliefs.  Recently,
a court in Egypt sentenced a sociologist to seven years in prison for “de-
faming” Egypt by asking some uncomfortable questions about how free
the country’s elections are.60  And look what happens to U.S.-based Chi-
nese scholars who are critical of the government: When they travel to
China they just disappear, and presumably go away to rot in some
prison.61
NL: This parade of horribles is a classic civil libertarian argument, but you
know that slippery-slope arguments are never persuasive.62  It’s always
possible to draw principled distinctions.  The NRA wants people to be-
lieve that, if we ban fully automatic assault rifles with sixty-shot clips full
of armor-piercing ammunition, there’s nothing stopping the government
from kicking in doors and confiscating hunting rifles from law-abiding
citizens.  But there’s a difference.  You can regulate weapons that have
no legitimate sporting or home-protective use—a principled distinction!
The First Amendment works just like the Second.  The principled distinc-
tion is found in the values of the legal system, including the fundamental
value of racial equality.  Expression that interferes with racial equality by
contributing to the social construction of racism can be regulated in order
to vindicate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.
The point of my analogy with government speakers is that lawyers by
their nature have an obligation to respect these legal values.  Of course
it’s true that lawyers act on behalf of private interests, but they’re heavily
regulated by the state, and they have an ethical obligation to respect the
law.  Their willingness to abide by the rules makes the system work.
Lawyers may not be state employees, but they’re not purely private ac-
tors either.  It’s well settled that state court committees and bar associa-
tions can make predictive judgments about an applicant’s fitness to prac-
tice law.  If someone has embezzled moot court funds, it’s more likely
that she will steal from their clients, so the state can deny her a law li-
cense.
CL: Right, but notice the standards that bar associations use in this screen-
ing—competence and honesty.  There’s no First Amendment impedi-
ment to punishing dishonest lawyers, or keeping thieves out of the bar,
60. Neil MacFarquhar, Egypt Sentences Sociologist to 7 Years in Quick Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, May
22, 2001, at A6.
61. Anthony Kuhn, China Convicts Third Scholar Tied to U.S., L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2001, at A1;
Craig S. Smith, Two Chinese Residents of U.S. Sentenced to Prison by Beijing, N.Y. TIMES, July 25,
2001, at A1.
62. See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985).
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just as the right to speak freely doesn’t immunize someone from prosecu-
tion for criminal conspiracy.  There also would have been no constitu-
tional problem with denying admission to Hale for another prosaic rea-
son: He was less than completely candid in his answers to the bar
application.  He had several arrests, as well as protective orders entered
against him, and he didn’t disclose them in response to questions on
point.63  As any law student who has had a professional responsibility
course will tell you, failing to disclose anything, even something so minor
as a speeding ticket, is an extremely serious matter to bar examiners and
is frequently cited as the basis for denying admission on character and
fitness grounds.64
NL: Those standards aren’t content-neutral, though; they embody a particular
vision of professionalism.  The state reasons that a lawyer who doesn’t
disclose traffic tickets has personal values that are incompatible with the
virtues of a lawyer.  All I’m arguing is that being a white supremacist is
surely more dangerous, from the standpoint of the effective functioning
of the legal system, than telling a little white lie about speeding tickets on
your bar application.
CL: No, those are different, because honesty is fundamental to the role of a
lawyer.
NL: So is treating people with respect and dignity!
CL: In any event, the bar didn’t go in that direction.  For some reason, the
committee members wanted to make a big show out of how committed
they were to racial equality in the legal profession.  Maybe they wanted
to endorse the position that you folks have been advocating in law re-
views.  In any event, rejecting Hale for failing to disclose a protective or-
der wouldn’t have been much of a statement about how politically cor-
rect the Illinois bar is, so instead they came up with this baloney about
certain fundamental constitutional values trumping the right to freedom
of expression.  As soon as the committee used Hale’s refusal to profess
the creed of racial equality, it became a case of Big Brother versus indi-
vidual liberty.  The government simply cannot be in the business of po-
licing lawyers’ political beliefs, or anyone else’s.
NL: “Political beliefs” sounds so innocuous—like Illinois is excluding Hale
because he’s a Republican.  But let’s be straight on this guy’s record.  He
is a dangerous individual who advocates violence against nonwhites.  Just
check out his website.  He says things like: “It is the program of the
63. Van Voris, supra note 6.  I am grateful to Bill Hodes for pointing out to me, and to other mem-
bers of the LEGALETHICS listserv, this basis for denying Hale’s application.
64. E.g., In re Gossage, 5 P.3d 186 (Cal. 2000) (discussing failure to disclose traffic and parking
tickets as alternate ground for denying admission); Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re: N.R.W., 674 So. 2d 729
(Fla. 1996); In re DeBartolo, 488 N.E.2d 947 (Ill. 1986); In re Majorek, 508 N.W.2d 275 (Neb. 1993); In
re Golia-Paladin, 472 S.E.2d 878 (N.C. 1996).
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Church of the Creator to keep expanding the White Race and keep
crowding the mud races without necessarily engaging in any open warfare
or without necessarily killing anybody.”65  Yeah, sure, without “necessar-
ily” killing anyone.  But everyone knows he was behind the shooting
spree of Benjamin Nathaniel Smith, who was trying to kill as many peo-
ple of color and Jews as possible.66  This is a very dangerous organization
we’re talking about.
CL: If there’s any First Amendment question that is well settled, though, it is
whether the state can punish advocacy of violence absent a clear and pre-
sent danger of imminent lawless action.  The answer is clearly no.  Hale
can put anything he wants on his website, and it’s almost certainly not
going to violate Brandenburg.67
We’ve been down this road before.  Remember the controversy about
neo-Nazis demonstrating in Skokie, Illinois?68  I know you’re probably
sick to death of talking about that case, but I cannot see how it is distin-
guishable.  The harm to the Holocaust survivors living in the town was
real and direct—it was visceral terror and indescribable sorrow—but the
court concluded that the Nazis’ expressive liberties trumped the interest
in protecting the town’s residents from emotional trauma.  However
hurtful Hale’s website is, it doesn’t do anything like make someone relive
Kristallnacht, the ghetto, and the death camps.
65. FAQ About Creativity, Question #21, at http://www.rahowa.com/faq1 (last visited October 21,
2001) (emphasis added).  See also id. at Question # 24 (“Q: But wouldn’t [the agenda of the group]
mean the decline and perhaps the extermination of the colored races?  A. Perhaps it would. . . .”),
Question #29 (“Hitler’s program was similar to what we are proposing.”).
66. Bill Dedman, Midwest Gunman Had Engaged in Racist Acts at 2 Universities, N.Y. TIMES, July
6, 1999, at A1.  See also Southern Poverty Law Center, The Great Creator, INTELLIGENCE REP., Sum-
mer 1999, at 23, 25-26 (detailing connections between Hale and Smith).  Another follower of Hale’s
“church” was convicted of a hate crime for beating a Cuban-American man in Florida.  See Associated
Press Wire, Breaking News, White Supremacist Convicted, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, at http://www.
nytimes.com/apoline/a/AP-Racist-Attack.html (July 29, 1999).  World Church of the Creator followers
have also been convicted of other hate crimes, including the murder of a black sailor returning from the
Gulf War in 1991, and the robbery and pistol-whipping of a store owner believed to be Jewish.  See
Belluck, supra note 2.
67. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
68. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978); see also DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS,
NAZIS IN SKOKIE: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1985); DAVID HAMLIN,
THE NAZI/SKOKIE CONFLICT: A CIVIL LIBERTIES BATTLE (1980); ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY
ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979); PHILIPPA
STRUM, WHEN THE NAZIS CAME TO SKOKIE: FREEDOM FOR SPEECH WE HATE (1999); Lee C. Bol-
linger, The Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an “Easy Case” and Free Speech Theory, 80 MICH. L. REV.
617 (1982) (book review); David Goldberger, Skokie: The First Amendment Under Attack by Its
Friends, 29 MERCER L. REV. 761 (1978).
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IV
HATE SPEECH IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
NL: Maybe the Nazis can have a rally in front of the village hall in Skokie (al-
though that was a crazy decision), but it does not follow that Hale can
take Nazi-style positions as a lawyer.  No lawyer has a First Amendment
right to make frivolous arguments, have ex parte contacts with judges, in-
troduce inadmissible evidence, or try to appeal to the prejudices of ju-
rors.  Why should Hale be allowed to pollute the legal system with his ra-
cism?  This case is unlike Rosenberger, because the judicial system is not
a public forum open to all speakers, like a college campus.  That’s why
the state doesn’t have to allow all viewpoints to be heard.
This isn’t just about one insignificant kook named Matthew Hale.  Ra-
cism and sexism are a big problem in the legal profession.  I don’t know
where to begin listing the cases I’ve read involving hateful speech, such as
a lawyer’s characterization of his opponent’s conduct at a deposition as
“little sheeny Hebrew tricks”;69 a bankruptcy lawyer’s reference to a
woman counsel for the United States trustee as “office help”;70 repeated
references to an attorney as “little lady,” “little mouse,” “young girl,” and
“little girl”;71 and a prosecutor’s comment that he did not believe “either
one of those chili-eating bastards” who were defendants in a death pen-
alty case.72 A state court judge in Illinois actually told a woman lawyer: “I
don’t think ladies should be lawyers.  I believe you belong at home rais-
ing a family.”73  One lawyer got so angry at his disqualification on the ba-
sis of a conflict of interest that he mailed a flyer to the prosecutor, who
was a woman.  The flyer read, “MALE LAWYERS PLAY BY THE
RULES, DISCOVER TRUTH AND RESTORE ORDER.  FEMALE
LAWYERS ARE OUTSIDE THE LAW, CLOUD TRUTH AND
DESTROY ORDER.”74 Are you telling me that the First Amendment
means that courts and state bar associations can’t act to eliminate this
kind of hurtful conduct by lawyers?
CL: Be careful of the context here.  No one is saying that Hale should be al-
lowed to wear white sheets in court and make references to the “mud
races” at trial.  Of course courts have the power to regulate the conduct
69. In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394, 397 (Minn. 1987).
70. In re Plaza Hotel Corp., 111 B.R. 882, 891-92 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990).
71. Principe v. Assay Partners, 586 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
72. People v. Sharpe, 781 P.2d 659, 660 (Colo. 1989).  The trial in this case was highly publicized
and the comments resulted in the widespread perception that the prosecutor was biased against Latinos
and was motivated by that prejudice to seek the death penalty.
73. Quoted in J. Cunyon Gordon, A Response from the Visitor from Another Planet, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 1953, 1956 (1993).
74. United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 1996).  The flyer was a copy of a headline
from an article in California Lawyer magazine, which reported on negative gender-based stereotyping
of female lawyers.  Id. at 1113 n.1.
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of attorneys who practice before them.  I’ll accept that the courtroom is a
non-public forum, where the government can impose content-based re-
strictions on speech, provided that it doesn’t discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint.75  The court can prevent a lawyer from making frivolous or ir-
relevant legal arguments that express positive or negative attitudes about
various ethnic groups.  For example, an African-American lawyer may be
ordered to remove a Kente cloth tie because of the possibility that it
might encourage the jury to decide the case on grounds unrelated to the
merits.76  As long as the court applies that rule without regard to view-
point, it is a permissible content-based regulation of speech in a non-
public forum.  You’re right that Rosenberger doesn’t apply to in-court
speech.
What the Illinois court committee is doing is completely different,
though.  It wants to penalize Hale for his public expression, that is, for his
speech in a public forum.  Even public employees are free to speak out in
public—think of a case like Pickering, where a schoolteacher wrote a let-
ter to the editor criticizing the school board.77  The First Amendment may
even forbid dismissing an employee for statements made within the con-
fines of the employer’s premises, as long as they don’t interfere with the
work of the office.78  Even if Hale were a government lawyer, the context
would be nothing like the arguable insubordination of Pickering or the
spectacle of an employee of the sheriff’s office expressing sympathy for
someone who shot the President.  A fortiori, the state cannot penalize a
private actor for having obnoxious views and expressing them on his own
time.
Denying Hale’s law license because of his out-of-court white supremacy
would be imposing an unconstitutional condition on the award of a gov-
ernment benefit or privilege.79  The government may not grant a benefit
to a person on the condition that the recipient refrain from engaging in
some constitutionally protected activity, even if the recipient is not enti-
tled to the benefit in the first place.80  For instance, a government agency
may not deny a job to someone or dismiss an employee for belonging to
“subversive” organizations,81 for refusing to take a loyalty oath,82 or for
75. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
76. This illustration is taken from the case of John Harvey, a lawyer in the District of Columbia.
Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE
L.J. 677, 685 (1995); Patrice Gaines-Carter, D.C. Lawyer Told to Remove African Kente Cloth for Jury
Trial, WASH. POST, May 23, 1992, at F1.
77. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
78. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1987) (holding that a clerical employee in the
sheriff’s office may not be dismissed for saying that, if another assassin took a shot at Ronald Reagan,
“I hope they get him.”).
79. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989).
80. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
81. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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refusing to declare belief in God.83  The Court has extended the protec-
tion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to government contrac-
tors.  Maybe there’s a very rough analogy with lawyers, who exercise
delegated powers from the state, and whose contracts may not be termi-
nated for speaking out against the government or for refusing to support
an elected official’s campaign.84
You can also handle the issue of courtroom speech and private speech
doctrinally by using the Supreme Court’s “time, place, and manner”
framework.85  A court could require that Hale take his racist speech out-
side, so to speak, and refrain from bringing up irrelevant matters during a
trial.  As long as the court’s order leaves open alternative channels of
communication (like Hale’s website), is narrowly tailored to achieve a
significant government interest (the interest in efficient and fair trials),
and is viewpoint-neutral (it prevents both Hale and a black civil rights
lawyer from referring to irrelevant matters), it is permissible.86
Not to pile on here, but I should probably mention that the Supreme
Court has generally protected insulting or offensive speech.87  You think
being called a “little mouse” is bad?  Think about how you would feel if
someone directed this diatribe at you:
After God had finished the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire, He had some
awful substance left with which He made a scab.  A scab is a two-legged animal
with a corkscrew soul, a water brain, a combination backbone of jelly and glue.
Where others have hearts, he carries a tumor of rotten principles.  When a scab
comes down the street, men turn their backs and Angels weep in Heaven, and
the Devil shuts the gates of hell to keep him out.  No man (or woman) has a right
to scab so long as there is a pool of water to drown his carcass in, or a rope long
enough to hang his body with.  Judas was a gentleman compared with a scab.
For betraying his Master, he had character enough to hang himself.  A scab has
not.88
The Court said that non-union letter carriers would just have to put up
with being called scabs and getting described as disgusting, slithering
82. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
83. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
84. Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996); O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of
Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
85. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781
(1989); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); United States v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
86. The federal court of appeals decision holding that a state could not prohibit the Ku Klux Klan
from “adopting” a stretch of highway to keep litter-free turned on the viewpoint discrimination inher-
ent in the state’s decision.  Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 2000). The state presumably would
not have been averse to permitting the NAACP to adopt the same stretch of highway; thus, its decision
to deny the KKK’s request was motivated by disagreement with that organization’s position.
87. E.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46, 55 (1988); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974); Papish v. Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670
(1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969).
88. Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 268
(1974).
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things.  The words may hurt, but the Court called the passage from Jack
London “merely rhetorical hyperbole” and “a lusty and imaginative ex-
pression of contempt,”89 no different from any of the examples you just
gave.
NL: I could give you counterexamples for every one of those rules you cite.
Example number one: The unconstitutional conditions doctrine may not
apply with the same force to the speech of lawyers.  Take Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,90 for example.  He
said quite clearly, quoting no less an authority than Justice Cardozo:
“Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.”91  Law-
yers in pending cases are subject to restrictions on speech to which an or-
dinary citizen would not be, Justice Rehnquist argued.92  He emphasized
that even rights as fundamental as those guaranteed by the First
Amendment may be subordinated to other interests that arise in litiga-
tion.93  The reason for this subordination is the special status of a law-
yer—she is an officer of the court, “an intimate and trusted and essential
part of the machinery of justice.”94
What you’re objecting to is the old right/privilege distinction, the idea
that a person who wishes to receive a government job may have a right to
talk politics but no right to be a policeman, in the words of Holmes.95  The
right/privilege distinction may be mostly a relic of the past in constitu-
tional law generally,96 but it still has some force in lawyer-speech cases, as
Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning in Gentile shows.
Counterexample number two: You say that mere offense, like the reac-
tion that a reader would have to the “scab” polemic, is never a legitimate
basis for restricting speech.  That may be the case, but courts have re-
peatedly held that some kinds of emotive harms are not “mere” offense.
I could cite the Court’s refusal to bring sexual harassment within the First
Amendment,97 even though much of the harassment undoubtedly occurs
89. Id. at 286.
90. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
91. Id. at 1066 (citing In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (N.Y. 1917)); see also People ex rel. Karlin v.
Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928).
92. See Gentile, 502 U.S. at 1071.
93. See id. at 1073 (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (holding that courts
may issue protective orders limiting the dissemination of information obtained in discovery).
94. Id. at 1072 (quoting In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 668 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
95. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
96. William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
97. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986); Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First
Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace
and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687 (1997); Suzanne Sangree, Title VII
Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in
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through the medium of speech, and I could try to distinguish the kind of
harm resulting from being called a scab—no big deal, I’d assert—from
the harm that results from having your whole dignity and worth called
into question on account of an immutable characteristic like your race or
sex.98  But instead I’ll use an example closer to home—solicitation by
lawyers.99  Even as the Court has significantly expanded the protection for
commercial speech, practically erasing the line between commercial and
non-commercial expression,100 it has permitted restrictions on lawyer so-
licitation to limit what?—offense, shock, and outrage caused by lawyers
contacting accident victims.  Sure, the Court said that the Florida regula-
tion was not aimed at responding to pure emotive harms—rather it was
concerned with “the demonstrable detrimental effects that such ‘offense’
has on the profession”101—but it’s clear that the state was targeting offen-
sive speech.  It even admitted as much when it said that “[t]he purpose of
the thirty-day targeted direct-mail ban is to forestall the outrage and irri-
tation with the state-licensed legal profession that the practice of direct
solicitation only days after accidents has engendered.”102
You can read the Florida Bar case one of two ways, either of which sup-
ports my argument.  One, the Court is not being entirely truthful when it
says that emotive harms can never be the basis for restricting speech.
Some kinds of emotive harms do indeed justify regulation; the only ques-
tion is which ones those are.  Once we admit that the harm from being
solicited by lawyers soon after an accident is a legitimate basis for con-
trolling lawyers’ speech, then a civil libertarian such as yourself has to
explain why that harm justifies limitations on speech, but the harm
caused by a virulent racist such as Matthew Hale does not.  Hale’s speech
is not “merely” offensive in the way that, say, George Carlin’s Seven
Dirty Words routine103 or the famous “Fuck the Draft”104 jacket is offen-
sive.  It is hurtful, evil, dangerous, demeaning, intimidating, and horrific.
Please don’t trivialize it by calling it “offensive.”105
The second possible reading of the Florida Bar case trades on what I call
“lawyer exceptionalism”—the claim I mentioned earlier, that lawyers
have such an intimate relationship with the rule of law that they are not
Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 461 (1995); Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does “Hostile Work Environ-
ment” Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997).
98. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?: HATE SPEECH,
PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997).
99. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
100. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Assoc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999); Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
101. Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 631.
102. Id.
103. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
104. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
105. Lawrence, supra note 12, at 461.
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purely private speakers.  Their speech can be limited along lines analo-
gous with government actors because, in a sense, they embody and de-
fend the law itself.  And because the law contains few values that are as
significant as racial equality, applicants to the bar can be turned down if
they refuse to respect that value.  (Certainly racial equality is more im-
portant than the freedom from having to read a direct-mail solicitation
from a lawyer!)  You need to appeal either to lawyer exceptionalism or
to some kind of unique emotional injury in order to explain the differ-
ence between the Florida Bar case, in which the Court held that lawyers
may be prohibited from making direct contact with potential clients, and
the Edenfield case, in which the Court reached precisely the opposite
conclusion with respect to certified public accountants.
V
THE CRITIQUE OF VALUE-NEUTRALITY
NL [cont’d]: For the sake of argument, though, I will admit that you may
be right as a matter of constitutional doctrine, but that’s just the point.
The civil-libertarian mindset is so entrenched that we have lost our ability
to see anything wrong with it.  We’re so captivated by Mill’s marketplace
of ideas metaphor that we have abdicated our faculty of making moral
judgments.  Are we really going to accept that Matthew Hale is just an-
other voice in the public debate and that we have to listen to him ranting
about “mud races” and praising Hitler because, for all we know, he could
be right?  This kind of radical moral and epistemological skepticism is
baseless.  Come on, why don’t we just admit that there is no value what-
soever to Hale’s speech?  That’s what the Illinois court committee did
when it said that lawyers must be committed to certain fundamental
truths about the rule of law and racial equality, and if they are not, they
should not have a license to practice law.
Courts make decisions all the time that are justified by the truth or falsity
of a substantive moral position.  That’s the point of Charles Lawrence’s
reading of Brown v. Board of Education.106  What was wrong with segre-
gation?  It communicated a false message of inferiority to African-
American schoolchildren, and because it expressed this false and stigma-
tizing idea, it was inconsistent with the constitutional value of equality
found in the Fourteenth Amendment.  This isn’t an empirical argument
that can be resolved by looking at “neutral” facts—it’s a political and
moral position about the constitutional value of racial equality and, I
might add, the relative importance of First Amendment freedoms like
the right to associate with whomever one pleases.  I might also add that
Lawrence’s argument is not some idiosyncratic critical race perspective.
106. Lawrence, supra note 12, at 438-39.
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Mainstream legal scholars are infatuated with the idea that legal rules
should be judged according to the moral values they express,107 and Law-
rence’s expressivist reading of Brown is often echoed by theorists with
very different ideological backgrounds.108
CL: These “expressive” theories are just policy arguments—they have no ba-
sis whatsoever in existing law.
NL: I’ll try another angle.  (I want you to see that this argument of Law-
rence’s is actually quite mainstream, jurisprudentially speaking.)  Con-
sider Ronald Dworkin, who is the canonical liberal political philosopher.
I think Dworkin is saying exactly the same thing as Lawrence concerning
constitutional values.  Although you probably don’t like to admit it, your
favorite liberal theorist’s position provides a basis for excluding Hale
from the Illinois bar.109
Dworkin says that a legal decision—a statute, a judicial decision, or an
administrative action—must express the community’s substantive moral
and political principles in order to be legitimate.110  We care about a state
that is just and about law that is fair.  Of course, people disagree about
what principles are just and fair, but state actors cannot refuse to decide
while they ponder the right thing to do.  They must act, and when they
do, they must act as if they are expressing a single, coherent set of princi-
ples.
107. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democ-
racy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990);
Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights:
Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993); Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
108. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 9 (1996); Akhil Reed Amar, The Case
of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992); Charles L.
Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Paul Brest, The Su-
preme Court, 1975 Term—Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1976); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term—Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92
MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994).
109. At this point, I am fairly certain that my hypothetical new left critic diverges from any actual
progressive or critical theorist writing about the First Amendment.  Dworkin is something of a bête
noire in those circles, although it is not always easy to see why.  His argument that legal systems ought
to be understood as expressing a coherent conception of the community’s values is obviously at odds
with the strand of CLS theory that emphasizes the incoherence of legal doctrine, but fits more nicely
with some critical race scholars who emphasize the existence of an anticaste principle in the Fourteenth
Amendment, or who understand rights as providing a space for outsiders to exist within the dominant
culture and address the powerful in terms they themselves favor.  To avoid misunderstanding, the
Dworkin-based passages should be taken as my own idiosyncratic approach to the critique of civil liber-
tarianism, not the reconstruction of other scholars’ arguments.
110. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 164-68 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LE].
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CL: Why on earth do you impose that requirement?  The law does not have
to be perfectly coherent.  Look at the First Amendment!  It looks more
like a Rube Goldberg device than a well-designed machine.
NL: Do you really want to abandon the ideal of coherence in law?  Sure, the
First Amendment is a mess, but civil libertarians are forever coming up
with theories to explain how all the pieces fit together.  You also get aw-
fully exercised if a decision doesn’t cohere with the existing cases.  Listen
to the arguments you have been making about Hale.  It disturbs you that
the Illinois bar committee’s decision does not fit with the principle that
insulting speech should be protected, or that restrictions on speech must
be viewpoint-neutral.
CL: Of course generality and consistency are what the rule of law is all about.
Judges must treat like cases alike.  That is what prevents the state from
arbitrarily granting favors to some and punishments to others on the ba-
sis of rules that do not apply generally.
NL: What would be wrong with granting benefits differentially if there was a
reason to do so?  In other words, if we could make the world a better
place by denying Hale’s law license, but granting a law license to Thur-
good Marshall, shouldn’t we do just that?
CL: Absolutely not!  That would violate Hale’s right to expressive freedom,
which is an aspect of the rule of law.
NL: Okay, this is Dworkin’s point.  The right you defend cannot be justified
solely on the basis of its tendency to do good, because we have stipulated
that we could do more good by denying it in this case.  A pragmatic de-
fense of the rule of law, which points to the good consequences that flow
from channeling the state’s coercive force in a particular way, cannot
support a nonstrategic account of rights.111  True, judges might want to act
as though people had rights because this “noble lie” would promote sta-
bility and predictability and have good consequences in the long run.
Taking rights seriously means adhering to them even when violating
them would lead to a better future.112  You obviously do take rights seri-
ously—you want to give Matthew Hale a “trump card” over the state’s
vision of a better society in which racial equality is respected.  In order to
make that kind of argument, you need to ground Hale’s right in some vir-
tue of the legal system.
You remember that rights are one of the central points of contention be-
tween two groups of new left critics—the critical legal studies “CLS”
movement and the critical race theory movement.  Where some CLS
scholars tend to emphasize the indeterminacy of rights and the manipu-
111. Id. at 151-64.
112. Id. at 160.
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lability of rights discourse,113 critical race theorists have described how
rights are a very important means for marginalized groups to address
their concerns to the majority.114  Rights enable outsiders to describe their
experience in the normative language that the dominant group under-
stands, appealing to values like stability and fairness that are an accepted
part of the majority’s moral scheme.  Rights force the in-group to live up
to their own ideals by showing that it is impossible, consistent with one’s
other values, to treat members of the out-group unfairly.
In other words, if we could do some good in the world by treating like
cases differently, by treating rights purely strategically, yet we think we
have reason not to do so, there must be some deep metatheoretical rea-
son for insisting that a scheme of legal rules be coherent, or possess the
virtue of integrity, as Dworkin calls it.115  That reason is legitimacy: Citi-
zens have an obligation to obey the law (as opposed to a prudential rea-
son to obey, lest they suffer punishment) only if there is a good moral
reason to treat the commands of law as reasons for them to act or refrain
from acting.116  All that future good consequences can give us are strategic
reasons for respecting rights.  Integrity, by contrast, calls upon judges to
give an account of rights that is ultimately grounded in each member of
the political community’s obligations of respect and concern for other
community members.117  When we treat each other as equals, we express
that respect by making certain sacrifices for one another.  Thus, even
though we disagree about what justice and fairness require, we accept le-
gal rules as legitimate if they are based on a coherent conception of the
community’s moral values which tries to make the best sense of all the
conflicting, contradictory positions of individual members.
CL: Why do you need to harmonize all of these conflicting beliefs into one
coherent position?  Why not just let the disagreement play out in the po-
litical sphere?  People can vote for legislators and executive-branch lead-
ers at the state and federal level, and those officials will enact legislation
and regulations that have as their basis a substantive moral position.
NL: What reason would someone have to respect those legal rules?
CL: The same reason one would have to respect any other bargain.  We ac-
cept negotiated compromises reached between competing interests as le-
gitimate because they keep the peace.  They permit us to go about our
lives knowing when the state will intervene in our affairs.  That’s all the
claim to respect the law needs.
113. Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984).
114. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987).
115. DWORKIN, LE, passim.
116. Id. at 190-215.
117. Id. at 199-202.
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NL: I disagree.  I think the law needs to be grounded in a “scheme of princi-
ples” that is presupposed by any legal rule, whether a piece of legislation
or a judicial decision.118  What the law seeks to do is to fit rules into a
public narrative—”an overall story worth telling now”119—that gives
meaning to the community’s political practices.  You know the famous
analogy of a chain novel.120  Each legal actor writes a new chapter, trying
to make the novel the best it can be, but constrained by the necessity of
fitting the new chapter with the ones written previously.  Criteria of what
makes a good interpretation are supplied by the ideal of integrity and the
attempt to show the community’s structure of institutions and rules in the
best possible light from the standpoint of political morality.121  And in the
case of our society, we have to recognize the increasing importance of the
value of equality, which is “one of the center beams of the legal order,”
as Owen Fiss notes.122
CL: What if there is no common “scheme of principles”? I am a civil liber-
tarian because, if there’s one thing that is clear to me, it is that we live in
a pluralistic society in which people disagree about practically every-
thing—certainly every political issue of consequence.  I cannot imagine
how you would discover a coherent scheme of principles that is accepted
by everyone in this society and which could serve as the moral basis for
legal decisions. I suppose that makes me, as the English political philoso-
pher John Gray terms it, an agonistic liberal.123  I believe in the centrality
and irresolvability of conflict over rights, the good, and political theory it-
self, so the last thing I want is for government to take a position on any of
these issues.
NL: But don’t you see, judges have to make decisions on the basis of some-
thing, even when there are competing principles at work in the law.
Dworkin gives an example of a tort case in which two principles apply:
First, that the costs of accidents should not fall solely on the injured
party, and, second, that a loss should not be borne by a party not at fault
for the accident.124  Both of those principles clearly exist in the legal sys-
tem, and they conflict in Dworkin’s hypothetical.  Do you propose that
the judge just flip a coin?  Unless you believe that a decision in a case like
this is grounded in nothing more substantial than chance, or what the
judge had for breakfast, you must grant that the result is justified by some
118. Id. at 211, 243.
119. Id. at 227.
120. Id. at 228-38.
121. Id. at 255-56.
122. FISS, supra note 108, at 11.
123. JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN (1996).
124. DWORKIN, LE, supra note 110, at 1 and passim.
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principle of political morality.125  What you decry as “just policy argu-
ments” are the moral basis for the legitimacy of law.
CL: This is what troubles me.  Whose morality are we talking about?  The
judge’s?  Why does she get to decide that moral issue?  Rights and prin-
ciples are contested, so I don’t understand why you remove them from
the democratic process and permit judges to make decisions based on
their own moral values.126
NL: No, those moral principles are found within existing judicial decisions.
Back to Brown: You have a Supreme Court case saying that a govern-
ment action that has the effect of stigmatizing individuals based on their
race is wrong.127  That moral principle is now a part of our legal system,
and any future legal judgment must take it into account.  There are other
cases, like Wisconsin v. Mitchell,128 which recognize the unique injury
caused by hate crimes.  Since Matthew Hale refuses to accept the value of
racial equality, admitting him to the bar would not fit with the paramount
moral value established by Brown and all the other cases canvassed by
Charles Lawrence.  Similarly, since he is stirring up hate and encouraging
his followers to commit crimes, the best way to fit this case with the prin-
ciple underlying Mitchell is to deny his application.
CL: I don’t see how you can possibly shoehorn all the cases and statutes that
define Dworkinian values into one coherent “scheme of principles.”  You
talk about Brown and the value of racial equality, but what about a case
like Buckley v. Valeo,129 which holds that speech may not be limited, even
to correct for inequalities in political power?  The Court has also consis-
tently held that state actors may not impose content-based restrictions on
speech to protect the constitutional value enshrined in the Establishment
Clause.130  Similarly, the Court’s affirmative action cases stand for a con-
ception of equality, namely strict color-blindness, which is different from
the kind of historicized conception of substantive equality that you fa-
vor.131  It seems to me that for every principle you point to, a reasonably
alert lawyer could find a counter-principle.  I don’t see any coherence at
all, let alone a coherent narrative that prioritizes racial equality over ex-
pressive freedom.
125. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 74-79 (1985).
126. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Princi-
ples and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
127. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
128. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
129. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
130. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
131. Adarand v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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VI
WHO IS THE SKEPTIC?
CL [cont’d]: I’ll grant you that, by our lights, Hale’s beliefs are morally
wrong and harmful.  But if you permit the denial of Hale’s law license
because he’s a racist, then what follows?  What if a different government
were in power—say, George Wallace in Alabama in the early 1960s?
Then a lawyer who wanted to challenge the regime of Jim Crow would be
denied admission to the bar because he showed disrespect for the law.
The idea of lawyer exceptionalism—the notion that lawyer have dimin-
ished expressive liberties because of their relationship with the rule of
law—is even more frightening when you consider that the rule of law has
not always been protective of the groups you want to protect.
NL: Here’s that move again!  You sneak in these relativist premises—“by our
lights” or “what if a different government were in power?”—as if truth
were a function of political majorities.  But Dworkin’s point is that these
values can be discerned in the legal system itself; they are not subjective
beliefs of individual judges.  He couldn’t be clearer about this:
Judges may not read their own convictions into the Constitution.  They may not
read the abstract moral clauses as expressing any particular moral judgment, no
matter how much that judgment appeals to them, unless they find it consistent in
principle with the structural design of the Constitution as a whole, and also with
the dominant lines of past constitutional interpretation by other judges.  They
must regard themselves as partners with other officials, past and future, who to-
gether elaborate a coherent constitutional morality, and they must take care to
see that what they contribute fits with the rest.132
The Court in Brown had no trouble concluding that the governments of
every Southern state were simply wrong about segregation in schools.
The equal protection clause forbids stigmatizing African-American stu-
dents by forcing them to attend separate schools.  The formal racial
equality of separate but equal schools was not enough to satisfy the Four-
teenth Amendment.  The only way to give effect to the Equal Protection
Clause in public education was to demand a different kind of equality—
the absence of the stigma of state-sponsored apartheid.133
That is a long answer to your question of why it would have been wrong
to deny admission to a black lawyer in 1960, but it’s not wrong to deny
admission to Hale today.
CL: What’s the difference?
NL: We’re right, they’re wrong.
CL: But wouldn’t George Wallace say the same thing?
132. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 10 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FL].
133. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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NL: He’d be wrong, we’d be right.
CL: This isn’t getting anywhere.
NL: No, actually we’re on to something here.  One of us believes in truth,
objectivity, and the relevance of moral values to legal decisionmaking;
the other does not.
CL: Now I’ve heard everything!  A postmodern, multicultural theorist talking
about values and objectivity.  I thought you believed in the social con-
struction of truth, the contingency of value, the relativity of ethics, the
absence of foundations, and all of that.134
NL: That’s a misreading of the progressive position.  First Amendment theo-
rists like Mari Matsuda have been perfectly clear that they are calling for
a “non-neutral, value-laden approach”135 to deciding First Amendment
cases.  It’s just that they’re honest about the relevance of values to the le-
gal decision.  All we are asking is for both sides to lay their cards on the
table.
The alternative is to create unwarranted doctrinal complexity.  Think of
the hate-speech case that everyone reads in torts class, Fisher v. Carrou-
sel Motor Hotel.136  The court ties itself in knots making an incident of ra-
cial discrimination into a battery, just because the hotel manager
snatched a plate out of the hand of an African-American customer.  I
have lots of fun with that case in my torts class, asking my students how
much contact is enough to constitute a battery, but eventually someone
figures out that it’s not a battery case at all.  Richard Delgado is right
that, in a few cases, the tort system recognizes racial insults as actionable
injuries, and that we ought to strip away the mystification and directly
recognize the cause of action.137
Ironically, it’s actually you civil libertarians who are committed to a posi-
tion that denies the possibility of moral objectivity.  You cannot abide
any government decision that is based on substantive moral values—
that’s what all the emphasis on content- and viewpoint-neutrality is all
about.
CL: That’s right, because substantive moral values are contestable.  People
disagree, and even when they don’t disagree, we can never be sure that
we know the truth.  As Mill said, “[w]e can never be sure that the opinion
we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion.”138  For that reason, we
134. E.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 23-40, 95-112, 121 (1997); Goodpaster, supra note 23, at 659.
135. Matsuda, supra note 11, at 2357.
136. 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967).
137. Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-
Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) [hereinafter Delgado, Words].
138. J.S. Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 20 (Stefan Collini ed., Cam-
bridge University Press 1989).
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don’t want the government making moral decisions for people.  That’s
what the Court meant when it said in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,139 that
“there is no such thing as a false idea.”140
NL: But don’t you see?  That’s a moral position you’re asserting!
CL: No, it is neutrality among moral positions.  It is an attitude of toleration
that does not endorse any of the competing systems of substantive values
that people bring to public debate—their “comprehensive views,” as
John Rawls calls them.141  The First Amendment guarantees government
neutrality among ideas competing for acceptance in the metaphorical
marketplace.  How is the civil libertarian position of neutrality not neu-
tral?
NL: It’s an ideology about how people ought to interact with one another,
what kind of institutions they should set up, what kinds of speech and
conduct are acceptable and what is out of bounds.  The principle of con-
tent-neutrality actually draws lines—it just pretends not to.142  Or, to put
the point another way, you claim that the First Amendment is somehow
“above” politics, but you have not noticed how politics has been smug-
gled inside your position.  Stanley Fish has been making this point for
years: “[S]ince speech is unimaginable apart from consequences and since
the consequences of any piece of speech will be friendly to some interests
and inimical to some others, the decision to draw a line between pro-
tected and regulated speech will always be a decision to advance some in-
terests and discourage others, will always, that is, be a political deci-
sion.”143  To get back to the Hale case, you have made a political decision
to deny admission to applicants who engage in a particular kind of
speech-act—lying about speeding tickets—while admitting applicants
who engage in another kind—advocating violence against people of color
and Jews.  Fish is simply asking you for a political justification for that
distinction, instead of the spurious argument from neutrality.
CL: You seem to think that I am engaging in some kind of covert moral ar-
gumentation, but the civil libertarian argument aims to take those deci-
sions out of government hands and put them where they belong—in the
hands of individuals.
NL: I’ll give you an example of the normative underpinnings of the legal rules
you take for granted:  We regulate obscenity because we think it protects
children and because our community is well served by marking off a
139. 418 U.S. 323 (1973).
140. Id. at 339-40.
141. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 12-13 (1993).
142. STANLEY FISH, There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech, and It’s a Good Thing, Too, in THERE’S
NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO 102 (1994).  See also STEVEN H.
SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 88-90 (1990).
143. STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE 94 (1999).
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boundary between the decent and the loathsome.  That’s what the gov-
ernment is doing, and it gets a value of X, however we want to measure
value.  On the other hand, producers of obscene speech have interests in
self-expression, in shocking people, in making money, and so on.  Those
interests get a value of Y.  Quite simply, the Court has determined that X
> Y.  It could have come out the other way.  In the flag-burning cases,
where X is honoring the central symbol of the country, protecting patri-
otic Americans from emotional harm, and maintaining a sense of public
order in chaotic, changing times, and where Y is the value of permitting
political dissent to flourish and permitting the self-realization of flag-
burners, the Court has decided that X < Y.  The Court is doing simple
back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit analysis.  It is not an apolitical exer-
cise.
This is an old point—almost a cliché in First Amendment scholarship—
but courts are permitted to discriminate on the basis of content.  Think of
all of the categories of speech which are given a lesser degree of protec-
tion or no protection at all: obscenity;144 defamation; group libel;145 fighting
words;146 commercial speech; certain kinds of expressive conduct, like
nude dancing147 and draft-card burning,148 that makes political elites un-
comfortable; conduct that occurs through the medium of speech, for in-
stance criminal solicitation and discrimination; speech to a captive audi-
ence;149 speech that is likely to be overheard by children;150 and so on.
Fish’s point is that speech never has value in and of itself.  These catego-
ries aren’t natural types, and they’re not value-neutral.  Rather, we draw
lines around protected speech because we want to do something else—
find the truth, safeguard political dissent, facilitate democratic decision-
making, whatever.151  We recognize that speech is aimed at doing some-
thing and suppressing speech is aimed at doing something.  The norma-
tive question then concerns the relative importance of what the speech is
doing versus what the government is up to when it regulates speech.
All of the existing categories of unprotected speech are set up the way
they are because of value judgments we have made.  And if you argue
that nude dancing is unprotected but that Nazi demonstrations are pro-
144. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50
(1976).
145. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 276 (1952).
146. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
147. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571 (1991).
148. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
149. See Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975).
150. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978).
151. FISH, supra note 142, at 104.
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tected, I have to conclude that the value you are concerned with is pro-
tecting Nazis.152
CL: Wait!  Before you go on,  I just wanted to point out that critics in your
camp, like Delgado, Matsuda, Lawrence, and Fish, always point to the
same categories and the same old, mostly discredited cases.  Chaplinsky
is a dead letter—look at all the cases refusing to apply it to serious provo-
cations.153  Everyone thinks Beauharnais is defunct after New York Times
v. Sullivan.154  The case about burning draft cards is anomalous, probably
wrongly decided on its own terms, and certainly called into question by
the flag-burning cases.155  And don’t forget about R.A.V., which is a case
about racist hate speech, or at least expressive conduct, in which the
Court said that the regulation in question was invalid as a content-based
restriction on expression.156
You were saying . . . 
NL: Whatever the current state of the categories of favored and disfavored
expression, if there are categories at all, then there is no politics-free per-
spective from which they can be constructed.157  That’s not an objection to
the practice of drawing lines and protecting some utterances and leaving
others unprotected.  But let’s at least be honest about the political value
judgments we are making.
Randall Kennedy has given a good example of this covert evaluative pro-
cess at work.158  Suppose there are two private universities in your state:
Clean Speech U. and Free Speech U.  At Clean Speech U., the emphasis
is on civility in dealing with one another—no profane language, no insults
or epithets, and everyone must be addressed by their last names, Mr. and
Ms. So-and-so.  Free Speech U. has none of these rules.  People can insult
one another freely, swear all they like, publish scurrilous articles about
professors in the campus newspaper—you get the picture.  (Paul Con-
verse would love it there; he would probably sell out of “Deanie on a
Weenie” T-shirts.)  Now suppose the state government wishes to reform
152. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 98.
153. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989); Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132
(1974); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972); Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969).
154. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
155. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
156. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  Once again, the Court was loose with its termi-
nology.  The city ordinance at issue was actually a viewpoint-based restriction on speech; the Court
noted that a sign urging racial tolerance would not be prohibited by the ordinance, while cross-burning
would be.  Id. at 391-92.  A content-based regulation would prohibit all speech pertaining to race, re-
gardless of whether the message conveyed was positive or negative.  Thanks to my colleague Ron Kro-
toszynski for pressing me to clarify this distinction.
157. FISH, supra note 142, at 113.
158. Randall Kennedy, Hate Crimes/Hate Speech, in SPEECH AND EQUALITY: DO WE REALLY
HAVE TO CHOOSE? 70, 71 (Gara LaMarche ed., 1996).
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education, and one of the items on its agenda is the kind of speech that
should be allowed at universities.  Is there any way to decide, based on
“neutral” principles, whether the educational environment offered by
Free Speech U. is superior to Clean Speech U., or vice-versa?  I don’t
think so.  You can only decide which of these models to favor by engag-
ing in a substantive argument about the nature of a good academic com-
munity.  That’s okay, of course, but you can’t pretend that it’s a value-
neutral exercise.
Martin Redish thinks it’s an effective response to this hypothetical to say
that Kennedy would have a hard time dealing with something like Ku
Klux Klan U., where a bunch of white supremacists band together and
exclude those who disagree with them.159  But it’s Redish who cannot jus-
tify banning Ku Klux Klan U. but yet keeping Free Speech U. open
solely on the basis of neutral principles.  He has to argue that segregation
is substantively wrong—morally, constitutionally, politically, practically,
whatever—while wide-open expressive freedoms, including the right to
engage in bigotry, is acceptable.  Why not just bite the bullet and admit
that you are making a normative argument?  It’s because you would then
have to admit that there is no good reason for letting Matthew Hale be-
come a lawyer.
Here’s another way the civil libertarian position is not neutral: You talk
about the right to free speech as if everyone had the same ability to
speak.  But they do not.  For one thing, permitting hate speech to flourish
has the effect of silencing its victims.160  It does not contribute to the dis-
covery of truth in the marketplace of ideas because the people to whom it
is directed are essentially beaten into submission.  Look at the stories
told by those who have been subjected to this kind of verbal assault.
They find themselves “in a state of semi-shock, nauseous, dizzy, unable to
muster [a] witty, sarcastic, articulate rejoinder”;161 feeling like they have
been hit in the gut, with symptoms of severe emotional distress, such as
“rapid pulse rate and difficulty in breathing, nightmares, post-traumatic
stress disorder, hypertension, psychosis, and suicide.”162  Members of the
target group are well aware of how these encounters can escalate into
violence—names like Vincent Chin, Matthew Shepherd, and James Byrd,
and the memories of victims whose names have not become national
buzzwords, like the African-American couple shot to death in North
159. Discussion, Hate Crimes/Hate Speech, in SPEECH AND EQUALITY: DO WE REALLY HAVE TO
CHOOSE? 72, 80 (Gara LaMarche ed., 1996).
160. FISS, supra note 108, at 5-26; Richard Delgado & David Yun, The Neoconservative Case
Against Hate-Speech Regulation—Lively, D’Souza, Gates, Carter, and the Toughlove Crowd, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1807, 1822-24 (1994); Frank Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 303-04 (1989).
161. Lawrence, supra note 12, at 455.
162. Matsuda, supra note 11, at 2332, 2336.
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Carolina as an initiation ritual for a white supremacist group,163 or the
Vietnamese-American high school student who was stabbed to death af-
ter enduring months of racial insults,164 are never far from their minds.165
Once again, there are mainstream jurisprudential analogues with my ar-
gument.  The best example is John Ely’s reading of footnote four in the
Carolene Products opinion.166  According to Ely, the Bill of Rights should
be interpreted to provide special protection to “discrete and insular mi-
norities,” those groups to whom the democratic process cannot be ex-
pected to be responsive. Judicial review of majoritarian decisions is justi-
fied as an attempt to correct for “market failure” in the political process.
That’s all that proponents of hate speech regulation are proposing—they
just want to ensure that everyone’s voice is heard, and not driven from
the marketplace of ideas through intimidation.
VII
THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION
CL: The natural response to that argument is that the inequality effects you
describe are the result of private, not state, action.167  There is no equal
protection violation when an individual utters a racist slur or expresses an
opinion about the inferior status of women.  In certain circumstances
there may be a statutory cause of action against the speaker—if the
speech occurs in the workplace, for example—but there is still no viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Thus, you don’t have another con-
stitutional right to trade off against the First Amendment, which still
trumps the asserted equality right.
NL: The problem with a formalist doctrine, like the public/private distinction,
is that it is blind to the reality of diffuse racism.  The system of white su-
premacy is not limited to discrete, observable state actions.168  Rather, it is
the synergistic effect of private acts and state indifference.  Look at
163. Walter M. Hudson, Racial Extremism in the Army, 159 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1999).
164. Matsuda, supra note 11, at 2332, 2335.
165. See also Robin D. Barnes, Blue by Day and White by (K)night: Regulating the Political Affilia-
tions of Law Enforcement and Military Personnel, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1079 (1996) (recounting numerous
incidents of hate crimes committed by members of white supremacist organizations).
166. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
167. JAMES WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE RADICAL ATTACK ON FREE
SPEECH DOCTRINE 85-90 (1999); Martin Redish, Hate Crimes/Hate Speech, in SPEECH AND
EQUALITY: DO WE REALLY HAVE TO CHOOSE? 64 (Gara LaMarche ed., 1996); Susan Gellman, Hate
Speech and a New View of the First Amendment, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 309, 311-12 (1995).
168. Lawrence, supra note 12, at 443-49; Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional
Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343, 383-86 (1991); Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).  For general ju-
risprudential discussion of the public/private distinction, which is a favorite subject for critical legal
scholars, see, e.g., FISS, supra note 108, at 17-18; Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423 (1982); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Pub-
lic/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
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Brown again.  It wasn’t just segregated schools that were the problem.  It
was the way “separate but equal” schools would be perceived by a racist
society and how segregation would reinforce the existing attitudes of in-
feriority perpetrated by the Jim Crow regime.169  Even today the socially
constructed ideology of racism is the status quo, so we cannot see how le-
gal rules that leave existing structures of private power in place actually
perpetrate racism.170  Hate speech props up that ideology by distancing
people of different races and perhaps subconsciously operating to con-
vince them of the truth of racist stereotypes.171
Once again, your position purports to be neutral but it is not.  As Charles
Lawrence puts it, the state action doctrine to which you appeal embodies
a value judgment—the judgment that the equality and dignity interests of
people of color ought to be outweighed by the interest that racist speak-
ers have in freedom of expression.172  Civil libertarians could argue for
that evaluative conclusion (although I think they’d be wrong), but what
drives me nuts is the attempt to circumvent the hard work of making the
normative argument by pointing to the public/private distinction.  We
need to get beyond this kind of formalism in reading the Constitution and
take a more realist approach to combating racism.173
CL: If I were laying money I’d wager that this argument is so radical that it is
unlikely ever to garner the support of courts.174  The public/private or
state action doctrine is pretty well entrenched.  I concede that it is not
wertfrei, as the sociologists say, but I think you misunderstand the nature
of arguments based on it.  Civil libertarians are well aware that private
actors, or even society generally, can inflict stigmatizing or humiliating
injuries, but they are more worried about what will happen as the result
of giving the government too much power to regulate the content of indi-
viduals’ thoughts and speech.
Anyway, your argument proves too much.175  Plenty of speech has the ef-
fect of silencing other participants in the marketplace of ideas, but I don’t
think you would be willing to regulate it.  For example, suppose you had
an acquaintance who was an out-and-out bigot.  If every time he ex-
pressed his bigotry he was mocked by his peers, eventually he’d figure
out that he ought to keep his mouth shut about his opinions.  That is, he
would be silenced.  I take it, though, that you would regard this as “good
169. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
170. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987).
171. Matsuda, supra note 11, at 2339-40; Delgado, Words, supra note 137, at 136-38, 145-46.
172. Lawrence, supra note 12, at 446-47.
173. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment,
1990 DUKE L.J. 375.
174. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 23, at 660-61.
175. See DWORKIN, FL, supra note 132, at 232.
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silencing,” not the “bad silencing” you fear as a result of racist hate
speech.  This distinction brings us right back to the problem I continue to
have with your proposals—they involve powerful officials in determina-
tions of good and bad opinions, beliefs, ideas, silencing, and so on.
VIII
THE GOVERNMENT: FRIEND OR FOE?
CL [cont’d]: These observations can be summarized in a pragmatic re-
sponse to your position.  As soon as the government gets into the busi-
ness of drawing lines between favored and disfavored speakers, you have
to worry about abuses of that power.176  The new left critics seem to as-
sume that restrictions on speech will always be applied to silence the Na-
zis and the Klan, while radical and inflammatory speakers on the left, like
Leonard Jeffries and Louis Farrakhan, will be permitted walk the fine
line between protest and “assaultive” or racist speech without getting in
trouble.177  It doesn’t always work that way, though.  Do you remember
Rudy Giuliani’s battle with Khalid Muhammad over permits for the Mil-
lion Youth March in New York?  (Come to think of it, Rudy Giuliani’s
efforts to silence anyone who disagreed with him!)  Look at countries
which have adopted hate speech regulations and notice what happened.
After the Canadian government passed an anti-pornography statute
along the lines suggested by Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon,
the authorities used it to prosecute the owner of a gay and lesbian book-
store and to confiscate copies of a book by bell hooks as a possible in-
citement of hatred.178  The only successful prosecutions under the British
hate speech statute have been of black people allegedly stirring up hatred
against white people.179  As for college hate speech regulations, that rec-
ord is also not so encouraging.  In the first year after the University of
176. Ira Glasser, Hate Crimes/Hate Speech, in SPEECH AND EQUALITY: DO WE REALLY HAVE TO
CHOOSE? 55 (Gara LaMarche ed., 1996); Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Let Them Talk: Why Civil Liberties
Pose No Threat to Civil Rights, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 20, 1993, at 37; Goodpaster, supra note 23, at
659.
177. Leonard Jeffries was fired as head of the Black Studies Department at CCNY for making what
the college deemed to be racist remarks.  On a federal civil rights challenge, his First Amendment claim
was denied under the reasoning of Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994), that in effect the em-
ployer’s interest in avoiding disruption in its workplace outweighed Jeffries’s expressive liberties. Jef-
fries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 9 (2d Cir. 1995).
178. These incidents are a staple of civil libertarian responses to calls to restrict hate speech, par-
ticularly since new left critics like Mari Matsuda have used the Canadian example as evidence that a
free society can tolerate some restrictions on racist expression.  E.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Dis-
sent, Free Speech, and Continuing Search for the “Central Meaning” of the First Amendment, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 1613, 1631 (2000).  See also Gates, supra note 176, at 43; Gey, supra note 23, at 247 n.154.  The
constitutionality of the statute was decided in Regina v. Butler, [1992] 89 D.L.R. (4th) 449.
179. WEINSTEIN, supra note 167, at 145.
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Michigan adopted such a restriction, twenty black students were charged
by whites with violations of the hate speech code.180
You’re assuming that government power will always be in the hands of
people who are interested in protecting marginalized groups, or that the
judges who administer these limitations on free expression will perceive
the balance of harms the same way you do, but I just don’t understand
that confidence given the experience here and abroad.  With the govern-
ment in the hands of people like Tom DeLay, Trent Lott, and John Ash-
croft, do you really want to give up the right to make value judgments for
yourself?
This is where your argument becomes incoherent: By definition, margi-
nalized groups don’t have much popular support, and if there’s anything
political actors are responsive to, it’s popular sentiment.  Wasn’t it Der-
rick Bell who said that black people will never achieve equality in this
country?181  If he’s right, then the last thing you want to do is hand over
power to a government that does not respect racial equality.  Indeed, the
true test of the First Amendment is how well it will protect those who ex-
press unorthodox ideas at times when there is strong public sentiment in
favor of their suppression.182  That is what civil libertarians mean when
they say that free speech is necessary for the protection of racial equality,
not antithetical to it.
NL: You civil libertarians are always harping on a couple of aberrational inci-
dents in countries that have robust hate speech regulations, but you must
know that these are isolated abuses, not at all typical of the way these
statutes are generally administered.183
More substantively, I always find this argument odd, although I hear it
constantly from civil libertarians.  It is as though you cannot find a satis-
fying theory of the First Amendment that would justify protecting hateful
expression, so you fall back on a strategic decision to hobble the power of
the government in a particular way.184  The alleged principle you defend—
the paramount value of free speech—is just a smokescreen!  I have to
thank you for making my argument for me.  You couldn’t have supplied a
better demonstration of the correctness of the critical legal studies attack
on the reification of legal rules and of the cynicism and intellectual dis-
honesty of legal liberalism.  (And so much for your fulminations earlier
180. Gates, supra note 176, at 45.
181. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Realism, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY 302, 306 (Kimberlé Crenshaw
et al. eds., 1995).
182. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449,
449-50 (1985).
183. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 98, at 101, 125.
184. Bollinger, supra note 68, at 626-27.
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about the new left position being just “policy,” in contrast with your “le-
gal” arguments!)
I would also note that you don’t carry through this critique to all gov-
ernment action.  Most of you ACLU types are New Deal Democrats.
You support the welfare state, large-scale federal solutions to problems
like poverty, pollution, and access to health care, and programs that give
a lot of power to the government, at least where the government’s power
is limited to taxing and redistributing wealth.  I find it interesting that
civil libertarians are not generally libertarians simpliciter, the kind of
people who rant about taxes being theft and who want to abolish the
EPA and the Department of Education because they represent untoward
concentrations of power in the government.  If you really believe in tak-
ing power away from the state, why is your hero FDR and not Newt
Gingrich?
If you like, though, I can perform the liberal dance of constructing post
hoc rationales for legal judgments.  The pragmatic argument assumes
that there is no line that can be drawn between denying a law license to
Matthew Hale and shutting down a gay and lesbian bookstore, or prose-
cuting Chris Rock for his repeated use of the n-word in standup routines?
(This matters only if you take a non-strategic attitude toward rules, of
course.)  First of all, we’re only talking about speech by a particular class
of people whose speech is particularly powerful, namely lawyers.  I am
not proposing criminalizing racist speech generally, although some of my
fellow travelers have made that suggestion.  Second, the slippery slope
arguments you civil libertarians are so fond of making are persuasive
only if they reveal the impossibility of making a principled distinction be-
tween protected and unprotected speech.  But there is a legitimate dis-
tinction available here:  These sorts of decisions can be made on the basis
of a rule that defines hate speech as something like speech that conveys a
message of racial inferiority, that is directed toward a historically op-
pressed group, and that is hateful and degrading.185  In this case, the dis-
tinction would be clear.  Hale’s hateful activities convey a message of in-
feriority, unlike the Canadian bookstore which aims to bring a
historically oppressed community together, to give it a voice, rather than
to take away that voice, as Hale seeks to do.  That’s why I don’t under-
stand the civil libertarian argument that the constitutional values of racial
equality and free expression are not in tension.  Of course they are, if
courts define with care the nature of the speech they are limiting in order
to further equal-protection values.
185. Matsuda, supra note 11, at 2357.
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IX
THE NORMATIVE BASIS FOR FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES
CL: I notice you are at least admitting that hateful speech conveys a message.
Some of the new left critics try to argue that hate speech, or pornogra-
phy, isn’t the expression of an idea at all.  They say it is more like a physi-
cal assault.186  You then have a hard time reconciling that argument with
the other argument your friends make, which is that racist speech con-
tributes to the social construction of racism in society.187  To me, that
sounds like you fear racist speech because of the idea it conveys and its
persuasive impact.  Charles Lawrence talks about the idea of white su-
premacy becoming entrenched in society because of an aggregation of
thousands of individual racist acts.188  In other words, he is worried about
the cognitive impact of hate speech.  That is certainly how Judge Easter-
brook read the Indianapolis anti-pornography ordinance in Hudnut.189
He took it as self-evident that the harm to be avoided was the message of
women’s subordination conveyed by pornography.190
NL: I am not committed to the thesis that all hateful expression is harmful be-
cause it communicates an idea.  Much of this garbage conveys only pure
emotive harm.  It really is more like a body blow than a debate.  That is
clearly Catharine MacKinnon’s position, with respect to pornography.191
Pornography has effects, just like ideas have effects, but it operates dif-
ferently than persuasive speech.  Pornography is something that is done
to women; it is analogous to discrimination, or rape.192  By the same to-
ken, a sign saying “whites only” is speech in the sense that it is symbolic
communication of an idea, but the law conceptualizes it as conduct, as
discrimination, rather than as expression.193
All of the major new left theorists are simply working within the existing
structure of constitutional categories.  Mari Matsuda’s objections run to
the content of the idea proclaimed by racist speech and its falsity and
harmfulness, which in some ways makes her proposal the most provoca-
tive.194  Charles Lawrence is more taken with the metaphor of fighting
words, so his proposal is aimed at the assaultive nature of hate speech.195
186. See, e.g., Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U.L.
REV. 793 (1991).
187. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., War of Words: Critical Race Theory and the First Amendment, in
SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX 17 (Henry Louis Gates et al. eds., 1994).
188. Lawrence, supra note 12, at 443.
189. American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1985).
190. Id.
191. CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 9-26 (1993).
192. Id. at 13.
193. Id.
194. Matsuda, supra note 11, at 2358.
195. Lawrence, supra note 12, at 451-57.
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Richard Delgado, too, conceives of hate speech as analogous to the inva-
sion of personal security and mental tranquility that is made actionable in
conventional tort law.196  That is a good distinction between many of the
hate speech cases we are worried about and the free-speech precedents
you cite, like the flag-burning case and the parody of the Campari ad at-
tacking Jerry Falwell; those utterances were directed into the wider mar-
ketplace of ideas, while a great deal of racist speech is one-on-one, in-
tended to intimidate, not to make a contribution (however crude) to
public debate.197  As Robert Post points out, if Larry Flynt were to call up
Jerry Falwell and ridicule his mother in the same terms he used in the
Campari ad parody, the speech would not be constitutionally privileged.198
Speech matters, and should be protected, when it communicates an idea
that is arguably worth paying attention to in a public forum.
In any event, two can play at this game of pointing out contradictions in
opponents’ arguments:  The really bizarre thing about the civil libertarian
position is that it’s self-defeating.  You stick up for people who have no
commitment whatsoever to freedom of expression.  If the Nazis came to
power, they would not only clamp down on the speech of liberals who
criticize the government, they would have them rounded up and shot.
And, in the name of the free exchange of ideas, you support expression
that isn’t an attempt to exchange ideas at all—it’s merely an effort at in-
timidation or harassment, more like a physical assault than a debate.
People who were in Skokie in 1977 report the reaction of the Holocaust
survivors to the Nazis: They were “almost in a catatonic state—petri-
fied—shaking—crying.”199  That’s not the result of a transaction in the
marketplace of ideas.  But because you have a formalistic view of the
First Amendment, you can’t see the difference between assaultive ex-
pression and speech that is aimed at furthering some kind of reasonable
discourse.
CL: There are two different arguments going on here.  The first one is pretty
easy to refute.  It is true that civil libertarians would protect speech by
those who would deny it to others, but the alternative is to suppress
speech, and that is precisely the harm to be avoided.  It is precisely be-
cause the Nazis would deny the freedom of others to speak that we must
protect it for the Nazis.  Legal decisions, such as one to deny a law license
to Matthew Hale, create precedents.  If we permit restrictions on the ex-
pressive liberties of people we dislike, we risk undermining legal protec-
tions for speech that ought not to be suppressed.  Remember, too, that
196. Delgado, Words, supra note 137, at 150-57.
197. Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech,
47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171, 184-85 (1990).
198. Robert Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic
Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 662 (1990).
199. STRUM, supra note 68, at 59.
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McCarthy sought to protect American democracy by clamping down on
those he perceived as enemies, but all he succeeded in doing was making
a mockery out of the democratic values he claimed to cherish.
The second argument is harder because it forces us civil libertarians to
confront the costs of free speech.  I don’t know of any better answer than
to say it’s a matter of choosing the lesser of two evils, but I admit can-
didly that I don’t know how to compare evils.  It’s horrible that the Holo-
caust survivors in Skokie have to see brown shirts and swastikas—I can
see why they could barely control their rage.  And I realize that the
Skokie residents had considered what we civil libertarians are always
telling people to do with racists—ignore them, deprive them of the atten-
tion they are seeking, and prevent racists and racist speech from being
driven underground where it might be even more dangerous.200  I can’t
argue with a person who watched his two-year-old daughter die when a
Nazi camp guard smashed her head with a rifle butt and now refuses to
roll over and let the Nazis get away with demonstrating in his town,201 or
someone who lost her parents and her brother in the Warsaw Ghetto and
is no longer willing to trust political elites to protect her from terror.202  I
believe that the United States is different from Weimar Germany and
that Nazis could never attain power here, but I respect people who think
otherwise, and for good reason.
I think that you, too, would be willing to require people to endure emo-
tional harm from speech in some cases though.  In these hypotheticals, I
think you would probably favor protecting the speech.203  Case number
one:  A young draftee returns from Vietnam after being shot at, seeing
his best friend blown up, and experiencing the terror and inhumanity of
combat for a year.  The moment he steps off the plane, he sees a poster
saying “Support the Vietcong!” or a picture of Jane Fonda sitting in a
North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile launcher.  What kind of psychic
impact do you think that would have?  You talk about racist speech as
making someone feel alienated from herself, but think of how this G.I.
would feel after being turned into a killing machine by the government
and then being told by his own fellow citizens that he is a loathsome per-
son.  Case number two: A woman has suffered through the trauma of
rape and has agonized over whether to abort the fetus.  When she finally
manages to get up the courage to go to an abortion clinic, she is con-
fronted with protesters screaming “baby killer!” and waving pictures of
bloody fetuses.  Isn’t that political protest protected speech?
200. See id. at 18.
201. Id. at 20.
202. Id. at 21.
203. These examples are from WEINSTEIN, supra note 167, at 162, although they and similar exam-
ples occur in much of the academic commentary critical of the new left position.
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I don’t want to get into ranking harms here, and I wish in no way to trivi-
alize the anguish that racist expression causes, but these political-protest
cases seem indistinguishable from the hate speech you wish to regulate.
The reason I can argue that the Nazis ought to be permitted to have their
demonstration in Skokie, and the reason I have faith in the solidity of the
American political order, is precisely because the system tolerates dis-
senting voices.  That’s a crucial difference between a system that would
protect Jews from Nazis and one which would not.
NL: You say you don’t want to get into ranking harms, but that is exactly
what we are both doing!  I’m just honest about it.  You think the balance
of evils mandates protecting speech.  I think in cases of assaultive, racist,
hateful expression there is no evil whatsoever associated with suppressing
that speech.  Are we at an impasse?
The best argument you have come up with for protecting racist speech is
this hybrid of the marketplace of ideas, protection of dissent, and demo-
cratic self-government rationales.  If that is the normative basis for pro-
tecting speech, it’s easy to distinguish racist speech on those terms: The
anti-war and anti-abortion protesters have a chance at being right.  The
war in Vietnam was a fiasco.  I strongly support a woman’s right to
choose, but I have to admit to having some qualms about the morality of
abortion.  The anti-abortion protesters are obviously moved by sincere
and deeply held ethical and religious beliefs, and we should allow those
beliefs into public debate.  Those kinds of dissenting voices ought to be
heard because they contribute to the public conversation that ultimately
results in a coherent account of the community’s moral principles.  We
end up saying, “this is who we are,” only after a long process of dialogue
and contention in which numerous positions must be heard.  That’s why
we allow protesters to burn flags despite the emotional harm experienced
by veterans who put their lives on the line for what the flag symbolizes.
On the other hand, the book is closed on white supremacy and on the
Nazis’ racist ideology.  There are two sides on many questions, including
the rightness of sending troops to Vietnam and certainly on all the issues
wrapped up in the abortion debate.  But you can’t tell me that there is a
kernel of a serious political argument anywhere to be found on Hale’s
website or in the Nazi literature that Frank Collin wanted to distribute in
Skokie.  These guys are just attention-seeking wackos, but dangerous
ones.  Why not permit dissenting speech where reasonable people could
disagree, but rule out of bounds speech that has no plausible foundation
in truth, permissible expression of dissent, or democratic self-
government?
CL: Now it’s you who are relying on arguments from skepticism!  You can’t
bring yourself to say abortion is right, or at least acceptable.  Instead, you
make the standard pro-choice argument that abortion involves wrenching
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moral and theological decisions that should be left to individuals, not
made by the state.  That’s fine, but notice that it is exactly the same as the
civil libertarian position on speech.  All we are saying is that people dis-
agree about most issues of significance in our political, cultural, and so-
cial life, and for that reason the government should not declare some be-
liefs taboo.  You realize, of course, that a committed pro-life activist
would make the same argument about abortion as you make about ra-
cism—it’s just flat-out wrong, so other kinds of rights can be limited by
the government in the name of eliminating a positive moral evil.
NL: Abortion is currently contested in our society in a way that the belief in
the Nazi program is not.  If there is any one belief that is taboo in con-
temporary American society, it is the belief in white supremacy.  Mari
Matsuda argues that racist speech should be treated as a sui generis cate-
gory to reflect its danger and utter lack of redeeming value.204  It is not
something that people disagree about or something about which there
can be a legitimate attempt to persuade.205
Where there is no reasonable debate about an issue, a state actor can
take sides.  That’s why a state university could refuse to hire a Holocaust
denier as a history professor, and it is why the Illinois committee was
right to deny Matthew Hale’s law license.  The community has already
established a moral story to account for its legal institutions, and the only
way to add a new chapter to that story, to borrow Ronald Dworkin’s
metaphor, is to exclude racist speech from protection.206
CL: I take it, then, that you are arguing for a very narrow domain of unpro-
tected speech.  If the First Amendment loses its force whenever there is
an issue that has only one side or where the community has unequivo-
cally taken a position, what are we talking about excluding from public
debate?  Holocaust deniers, flat-earth theorists, and white supremacists.
Anyone else?
NL: Yes.  I would extend the regulation to expressions of male dominance,
like pornography, and belief in heterosexual superiority, like anti-gay
speech.  These utterances do not contribute to the community’s attempt
to construct a coherent, attractive account of its fundamental moral prin-
ciples.  “Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argu-
ment,” Mill said207, and civil libertarians are forever preaching that the
remedy for harmful speech is more speech.  But there is a class of utter-
ances that reveal beliefs which are extraordinarily resistant to persuasion,
204. Matsuda, supra note 11, at 2357.
205. Cf. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
334 (1991) (arguing that the government may not suppress speech on the ground that it may persuade
someone to do something that the government considers harmful).
206. DWORKIN, LE, supra note 109, at 228-38.
207. Mill, supra note 138, at 23.
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and that is the category of statements of racial, gender, and other biases
that are irrational and pernicious.  There’s no point opposing Hale’s
speech with more speech—he’s simply not listening.
CL: Aha!  You’re not limiting censorship to expressions of beliefs on which
the book is closed.  Of course, you have to sweep broadly—otherwise
your proposals have no practical effect.  If courts permit incursions on
the First Amendment only where speech by the lunatic fringe is at issue,
maybe the damage to freedom of expression is lessened, but by definition
the impact will be slight, since lunatic fringe speech isn’t that much of a
problem.  What I worry about is what the military calls “mission creep.”
Limited interventions have a way of gradually morphing into full-scale
commitments of ground troops.  The same could happen here.  The gov-
ernment starts by clamping down on the World Church of the Creator
and NAMBLA208 and other groups with absolutely no reasonable mes-
sage, and the next thing you know, officials target speech that makes
them uncomfortable but which ought to be heard.  Think of Rudy Giu-
liani again.  It’s anti-hate-speech precedents that give him the straight-
faced argument against granting a permit to the Nation of Islam for the
Million Youth March.
I’ve seen this happen at universities all the time.  These anti-
discrimination statements, hate-speech codes, diversity training sessions,
and whatnot have a momentum of their own.  Every interest group on
campus wants to jump on the bandwagon and assert that they are tradi-
tionally disadvantaged and in need of protection.  The next thing you
know, we’re tacking sexist, homophobic, ageist, and goodness knows
what else onto the restrictions on racist speech.209  I agree with you that
racism is an idea with no arguable merit, but some of these speech codes
reach ideas that are much more debatable.  Would a restriction on hostile
speech that is directed at an individual on the basis of religion prohibit a
vehement attack on the policies of the Sharon government in Israel?
What about speech on the basis of disability?  Would that prohibit a con-
stitutional law professor from criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision
about the handicapped golfer?210 Could a college student be sanctioned
for having a party in his apartment to watch the season finale of The So-
208. The North American Man-Boy Love Association, a favorite example for First Amendment
professors to use on students who argue for absolute protection for all speech.
209. E.g., UWM Post v. Bd. of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (quoting the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin’s racial and discriminatory conduct policy, which regulates expressive behavior di-
rected toward individuals on the basis of “race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation,
national origin, ancestry or age”); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest
Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 524 (quoting Stanford University’s discriminatory harassment code that
restricts certain expression based on an individual’s “sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orienta-
tion, or national or ethnic origin”).
210. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 523 U.S. 661 (2001).
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pranos, a show that arguably perpetuates harmful anti-Italian-American
stereotypes?
Let’s get back to the silencing argument, though.  I can think of plenty of
utterances that might have the silencing effect you fear but which should
be protected.  I’ll give you an example that came up in the litigation over
the University of Michigan’s hate-speech code.211  A graduate student in
social work stated in class that he believed homosexuality was a disease
that could be treated through counseling.  He was brought up on charges
of sexual orientation harassment on the grounds that he had engaged in
speech that was intimidating and hostile.
NL: There are two possible responses to that incident.  Mine is to say “hur-
rah” for the university.  We all know that homosexuality is not a disease
and that this graduate student was just a bigot.  It was wrong for him to
silence his classmates and thereby (ironically, because he appeals to the
value of the marketplace of ideas) to stifle the free flow of discussion in
the classroom.  Everyone in the relevant discipline of social psychology
or whatever knows that homosexuality is not a disease, so there is no
more value in letting this jerk talk than there would be in giving a re-
spectful hearing to a Holocaust denier in a history classroom.  And if we
could silence this guy in the classroom, then surely we could exclude that
kind of speech from the legal system which is committed to certain fun-
damental truths, as embodied in the constitution.
The other response, the one you probably favor, is to admit frankly that
the book may not be closed on these matters. The current science may be
inconclusive on whether homosexual desire may be “cured”—or to use a
less inflammatory term, altered—by counseling and therapy.  Whether
people ought to be subjected to that kind of therapy is a normative judg-
ment that depends on our beliefs about sexuality, the family, privacy, and
a host of other issues which are all contested in our society.  The govern-
ment, through its agents like state universities, should not step in and es-
tablish an authoritative view on these moral issues.
But because rights are not neutral, because they embody a particular vi-
sion of the good—one of free, detached, autonomous individuals—the
second position is still a substantive moral one.  It’s just not a particularly
attractive normative vision.  I propose, on frankly policy grounds, rules
for a better kind of society.  Since either way it’s a normative decision,
why not be overt about the value judgments we both are making?212
211. Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 865 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
212. Cf. Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional
Scholarship, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 935 (2001) (arguing that the problem of reconciling judicial review
with democracy is a distraction from what ought to be the real agenda of legal scholarship, which is ad-
vancing normative arguments).  See also Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
WENDEL_FMT.DOC 06/04/02  3:38 PM
Page 33: Spring 2002] CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS 77
Earlier I was making an argument by Dworkin (Ronald, not Andrea!)
that our legal system is justified by a “scheme of principles,” his idea that
political legitimacy is ultimately a function of a coherent, attractive public
narrative that makes the best possible interpretation of the community’s
practices.213  The reason we suppress bigoted speech is that the fundamen-
tal value of racial equality is paramount in our constitutional system.  The
scheme of principles obviously contains protection for a great deal of
speech, but it has to draw lines between acceptable and unacceptable ut-
terances.  And the only way to protect the countervailing value of equal-
ity is to declare certain points of view simply illegitimate.  If we permit
racist speech to exist on the assumption that there may be some value in
it, we legitimate it.214  This is why the historian Deborah Lipstadt refuses
to debate Holocaust deniers.215  If she were to go on a talk show with one
of these bozos, it would imply that they have ideas worthy of being taken
seriously, and that itself would be false.
X
DISAGREEMENT AT THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL THEORY
CL: I remember that discussion.  And all that talk about coherence and integ-
rity and the “best possible constructive account of the community’s insti-
tutions” made me want to reach for my checkbook and renew my ACLU
membership immediately.  (Or—and here is a weird turn of events—it
made me think there might be something to law and economics, which is
at pains to establish that individuals should be able to define well-being
for themselves, without inference by the government.216)  Deborah Lip-
stadt is free to do whatever she likes, but the government should not be
empowered to decide that some ideas shouldn’t be taken seriously.
NL: But don’t you see, the government is already doing the same thing that
Lipstadt is doing.  It is declaring certain ideas out of bounds, but it is con-
cealing that value judgment through doctrinal hocus-pocus, like the
speech/conduct distinction.  Also, the decision to give strong protection
to speech is itself a political decision in the sense that it imagines a par-
ticular vision of the good for society.  This talk about neutrality obscures
the extent to which a government that gives Matthew Hale a trump card
called a “right,” that enables him to put up a hateful website despite all
the harm it causes, is going to foster a public culture of individualism,
public disengagement, alienation from sources of value, and conflict that
213. DWORKIN, LE, supra note 110, at 211, 243.
214. Gates, supra note 176, at 39-40 (citing Alexander Bickel).
215. DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: THE GROWING ASSAULT ON TRUTH
AND MEMORY (1993).
216. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 980 (2001).
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is channeled into litigation over the assertion of rights.217  All I’m asking is
for you to give me a substantive normative argument for that result.
CL: Once again, even though we disagree, we’re on to something significant.
You have pressed me to defend on the merits what Sir Isaiah Berlin re-
fers to as negative liberty.218  Negative liberty is what a person has when
he or she is left to do whatever he wishes without interference from oth-
ers.219  Certainly it is true that the (negative) liberties asserted by different
people will collide, and some of these asserted rights must be curtailed in
the interests of peaceful coexistence, but there is nevertheless a core zone
of freedom that may not be interfered with by the government for the
sake of the public good.  Positive liberty is a more elusive notion.  For
Berlin, it meant something like “being one’s own master,” so that the
shape of one’s life depends solely upon one’s “true” self—being a ra-
tional, autonomous being as distinguished from a slave to one’s animal
nature or passions.220  This by itself is not problematic; of course, some
degree of positive liberty is necessary to leading a good life.  The danger
in relying too much on a conception of freedom as positive liberty is that
it may be taken to follow from the separation of a person into higher and
lower selves that a collective entity—a state, a tribe, a race, a church—
may coerce people into following some goal that they ostensibly would en-
dorse if they could only free themselves from the domination of their
lower natures.221
I tend to agree with Judge Posner that the Constitution is “a charter of
negative rather than positive liberties.”222  The significance of that distinc-
tion is that the government cannot enforce regulations that are aimed at
removing barriers to individuals who wish to realize a particular way of
life or vision of the good, such as racial equality.  The new left is on the
side of a positive conception of liberty, of a broad sphere of government
authority to place restraints on individual action in the name of realizing
a better life.  The most prominent theorists in your camp admit as much:
“What is ultimately at stake in this debate is our vision for this society.”223
Similarly, the crusade against pornography has been animated by the de-
sire to enable women to be in control of their bodies and the political
217. E.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF (1986).
218. BERLIN, supra note 20, at 194.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 203-05.
221. See also Isaiah Berlin, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY 1
(Henry Hardy ed., 1990).
222. Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1189-90 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., concurring).
223. MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 15 (1993).
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construction of their worth as human beings, rather than consigning them
to the lower status of objects of male fantasies.224
As an abstract proposition, enhancing the ability of people to govern
themselves sounds unobjectionable.  The political implications of that po-
sition are what I find troublesome.  A government that wishes to enhance
individuals’ ability to realize their true potential must, of course, be in the
business of defining “true,” genuine, or authentically good ways of life.
Again with the law-and-economics crowd, I think the government ought
to be protecting the liberty of people to do what they regard as valuable,
not guiding us in the direction of some hypothetical good life that is dif-
ferent from the object of anyone’s actual concern.225
NL: I see the point of your negative and positive liberty distinction, but as
long as you’re going to invoke Berlin, it only seems fair to point out that
his arguments for preferring negative to positive liberty have struck many
people as unconvincing.226  One problem is internal to Berlin’s distinction.
He prefers negative liberty because there is no single common human na-
ture that is universal, toward which we all aspire.  Thus, it follows that
there is no basis in some higher value for restraining individuals from
living their lives as they see fit.  But if that is so, then the same critique
can be turned against a political system which rests on so-called negative
liberty.  Any decision to accommodate the competing liberty-claims of
individuals will itself be an evaluative judgment, and if there is no com-
mon human nature upon which to ground this judgment, then it is just as
illegitimate as any other political decision that is justified by enhancing
the positive liberty of individuals.  Once again, we cannot avoid norma-
tive arguments about substantive moral visions or conceptions of the
good.  Berlin says these conceptions of value are incommensurable, but
then he doesn’t offer a very satisfying account of choosing among in-
commensurables.
CL: Of course, there are many such arguments that could be offered.  You
could make a consequentialist argument, claiming that negative liberty is
necessary for the accomplishment of something else that is an acknowl-
edged good, like the discovery of truth, in the context of expressive liber-
ties.  This is not exactly Berlin’s position, but many other liberal political
philosophers have made arguments like this. As Mill puts it, for example,
you could argue that a “hands-off” attitude by the government toward
ideas is necessary to create a vigorous intellectual environment, where
people are free to try out new, possibly heterodox ideas.227  Or, to use an-
other one of Mill’s arguments, you can argue for permitting ideas you
224. DWORKIN, FL, supra note 132, at 219-20 (summarizing Catharine MacKinnon’s argument).
225. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 216, at 1340.
226. See, e.g., JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN 21-37 (1996).
227. Mill, supra note 138, at 36.
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disagree with to flourish on the grounds that you need to understand
them, and study them carefully, in order to be better able to refute
them.228
NL: But Mill says the distinction between truth and falsehood is that truth can
withstand attempts to suppress it, rising again and again until eventually
in an enlightened time it is recognized as such.229  Are you really arguing
that we need to protect bigoted speech because, for all we know, in the
future white supremacism may turn out to be true?  Or that the noncon-
forming opinion, here hate speech, contains part of the truth that it
shares with the received opinions?230  I don’t think you want to go there.
As for the argument that I need to understand hate speech in order to re-
fute it, I don’t see what there is to understand.  Bigots think that people
unlike them are inferior.  There’s no idea there—it’s just a visceral ha-
tred—so there can be no benefit to the quality of debate from paying
close attention to those statements.  What’s the point in “throwing myself
into the mental position” of Matthew Hale?  I know what’s in his mind—
hate and evil.  I understand it perfectly well already; I don’t need his
website to help me.  The marketplace of ideas has never struck me as a
good argument for protecting something like hate speech that isn’t the
assertion of a claim to truthfulness.  It would be like arguing that you
should protect professional wrestling because it might lead to the discov-
ery of truth!  Hate speech is an assault, not a contribution to public de-
bate.
CL: I don’t need to claim that hate speech is likely to be true.  Mill also rec-
ognizes what contemporary theorists call the “chilling effect” argument.
Even if bigoted speech has no value as a step on the road to discovery of
truth, if we fail to protect that kind of expression we risk casting a pall
over the whole metaphorical marketplace of ideas.  Other speakers
whose ideas may be unpopular may be deterred from participating in
public debate by the fear that their ideas might be deemed heretical.
“Who can compute what the world loses in the multitude of promising in-
tellects combined with timid characters, who dare not follow out any
bold, vigorous, independent train of thought, lest it should land them in
something which would admit of being considered irreligious or im-
moral?”231  No one would call people like Louis Farrakhan or Leonard
Jeffries “timid,” but you can imagine someone less bold, but having
similar ideas, who would be driven from the marketplace of ideas by the
threat of government penalties for hate speech.  Just remember what
228. Id. at 38-39.
229. Id. at 31.
230. See id. at 47.
231. Id. at 35.
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Southern state governments tried to do to Thurgood Marshall and the
NAACP during the civil rights movement.
The significance of Mill’s “partial truth” argument is that even pretty
nasty speech may contain a germ of truth, and it ought to be protected
for that reason.  Alternatively, some utterances you may wish to classify
as hate speech may nevertheless be valuable because they expose the
pomposity, self-righteousness, or hypocrisy of political or academic elites,
or because they satirize prevailing attitudes and beliefs.  And you can
combine this argument with the chilling effect argument and observe that
it can be difficult to distinguish between legitimate commentary and sat-
ire, delivered in an effectively biting form, and valueless “hate speech.”
Think of the controversy over the rap group 2 Live Crew.  Their lyrics
are always being denounced as misogynist, and maybe they are, but the
group responds that they are just parodying mainstream rap, or maybe
producing a reductio ad absurdum of their fellow rappers.  (If that exam-
ple makes me sound dated, you can use the more recent case of Eminem,
who says his anti-gay and misogynist lyrics are also intended parodically.)
Do you want government officials making decisions about whether a par-
ticular music recording is valuable?
But let’s take another tack.  You can also make nonconsequentialist ar-
guments for the protection of speech.  Another argument for negative
liberty is that autonomy has intrinsic value.  “[T]he freedom to do what
one wants, or to make choices, is valuable for its own sake.”232
NL: I’ve heard that argument so many times I’ve lost count.  The thing that
continues to trouble me about it, though, is that I don’t see a value to
autonomy that permits people to make bad choices.  What on earth is
valuable in Matthew Hale’s freedom to be a bigot?  I’ll give you an ex-
ample I borrowed from David Luban.233  Suppose a guy named George
has a beautiful cherry tree on his land.  It is a local landmark.  People
come from miles around to look at his tree, and a photo of it even graced
the cover of the phone book.  One day, George buys an axe.  He decides
he is going to test out his axe by chopping down the cherry tree. He
doesn’t need the land the cherry tree is standing on for any purpose, he
just wants to have a few whacks at a tree with his axe.  So, he chops down
the tree.  We know he had political autonomy to do it—no one is arguing
that the local government should interfere with his right to do what he
chooses with his tree in this case—but I want you to tell me, what is good
or valuable about George’s autonomy in that case?
232. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Civic Virtue and the Limits of Constitutionalism, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2131 (2001).
233. David Luban, Two Discourses on Human Dignity (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
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CL: Well, I suppose negative liberty can also be defended as a necessary pre-
condition for an individual’s development of her own natural endow-
ments without which it is impossible to pursue other ends.234
NL: Apply that argument to the cherry tree example.  How does it benefit
George to give him space to decide to chop down the tree?  He has
learned nothing as a result, except perhaps that he doesn’t really enjoy
chopping down trees.  He is not developing his natural faculties or pur-
suing a substantive vision of the good life—he’s just idling away time,
ruining natural beauty for others, and in no way becoming a more fully
realized human being.  I think something similar is true of the hate-
speech cases.  The core zone of freedom you would give to bigots does
not enable them to develop as persons; rather, it just enables the waste of
something valuable, with a concomitant interference with the interests of
others.
CL: For autonomy to be meaningful, it must permit people to make bad
choices as well as good.  Unless you want to be a neo-Aristotelian and
argue that only good choices are valuable, you have to allow people
space to choose unwisely.  Otherwise they do not have the opportunity to
be truly the authors of their own lives.235
I could also argue that the good in the George case is simply the absence
of government interference.  Let me give you a negative argument for
negative liberty.  I don’t have to maintain the thesis that autonomy has
intrinsic value, provided I can convince you that it’s a bad thing to give
government the power to interfere with peoples’ decisions about how to
live their lives.  Why would it be bad?  First, because we think the gov-
ernment is tempted to abuse this power, or to exercise it to the detriment
of disfavored groups who, because of their numerical size or the history
of discrimination against them, are unable to force the government to re-
spect their interests.
Aryeh Neier makes the latter argument in his book on the Skokie case.236
He observes that the only “alternative to freedom is power,” and that
Jews can be safe only in societies in which restraints are placed on
power.237  He goes on, in a moving passage:
The restraints that matter most to me are those which ensure that I cannot be
squashed by power, unnoticed by the rest of the world.  If I am in danger, I want
to cry out to my fellow Jews and to all those I may be able to enlist as my allies.
I want to appeal to the world’s sense of justice.  I want restraints which prohibit
those in power from interfering with my right to speak, my right to publish, or
my right to gather with others who also feel threatened.  Those in power must
234. BERLIN, supra note 20, at 196.
235. GRAY, supra note 226, at 30-32 (describing Berlin’s position).
236. NEIER, supra note 68, at 4.
237. Id.
WENDEL_FMT.DOC 06/04/02  3:38 PM
Page 33: Spring 2002] CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS 83
not be allowed to prevent us from assembling and joining our voices together so
we can speak louder and make sure that we are heard.238
In other words, Neier is on the side of negative liberty because govern-
ments which seek to enforce some kind of positive vision of human good
can too easily abuse their power.
NL: Again, that is a purely strategic argument, and it is based on assumptions
that may not stand up to empirical scrutiny.  You think the danger of
government abuse of power is a greater evil than the enduring bigotry
that people of color must suffer.
You’re right that progressive constitutional theorists have in mind a vi-
sion of the good for society.  This is an important point to emphasize.
Robin West, for example, reads the Equal Protection Clause as a charter
of positive liberty.239  The Fourteenth Amendment demands substantive
equality, not merely the kind of formal equality parodied by Anatole
France’s quip that the laws of France prohibit the rich as well as the poor
from sleeping under bridges.240  In the context of expression, equality
means not resting content with reassuring marginalized groups that they
have the same formal liberties as their rich, majority-race, male peers, but
undertaking to correct systematically for dysfunctions in the marketplace
of ideas that unfairly skew public discourse in favor of the powerful.
In the end, we’re doing the same thing.  Despite your protests to the con-
trary, you are asserting a normative vision too.  It seems as though the
one thing we can agree upon is that First Amendment issues invariably
resolve into constructive moral arguments; there is no such thing as a
neutral, value-free standpoint from which the competing positions can be
assessed.
* * *
That, in any event, is my view.  It does not follow that the new left position
is the correct one.  It may very well be the case that we should prefer the civil
libertarian’s proposal to leave hateful expression unregulated for substantive
moral and political reasons.  But I do think the new left theorists deserve a
great deal of credit for relentlessly demanding a normative justification from
the civil libertarians for the welter of constitutional rules that are implicated in a
case like the Hale bar-admissions controversy.  The state action doctrine, the
speech/conduct distinction, the right/privilege distinction, the principle of con-
tent- and viewpoint-neutrality, the Barnette/Gertz notion that there is no such
thing as a false idea or government-identified heresy, the clear and present dan-
238. Id. at 4-5.
239. ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 114-18 (1994).
240. “The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to
beg in the streets, and to steal bread.”  ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY (1894).
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ger test, and the rule that emotional harms are insufficiently weighty state inter-
ests to justify regulation, are all a familiar part of First Amendment discourse.
Thanks to the new left critics, their familiarity no longer insulates them from the
requirement of a normative foundation.
On the other hand, the new left argument that racial equality is a fundamen-
tal constitutional value on a par with the freedom of speech seems difficult to
contain within principled boundaries.  Particularly if a court takes seriously the
argument that private bigotry and state action together contribute to the social
construction of racial or gender inferority, a wide range of expression may be
susceptible to regulation.  Susan Gellman gives the example of the story of Cin-
derella that perpetuates a view of women as helpless, passive, and dependent
upon rescue by powerful men.241  Surely this story contributes to a cultural envi-
ronment that is oppressive to women, yet no one would seriously suggest that it
should be regulated, directly or indirectly.  What should be the principled dis-
tinction between an applicant for the bar who has written a story similar to Cin-
derella and Matthew Hale?  Various members of the new left have suggested
distinctions, sometimes involving an element of mens rea, such as an intent to
demean a particular person on account of race or sex,242 or a tendency to pro-
voke immediate violent response,243 which would presumably not apply to Cin-
derella, Eminem records, or Chris Rock monologues.  As civil libertarians have
frequently observed, however, the relatively narrow boundaries accepted by
new left critics, which are necessary to enable courts to make principled distinc-
tions of the kind suggested here, tend to minimize the impact of hate-speech
regulations on the problem of societal racism and gender inequality.  And if the
restrictions are cabined by some principle other than the constitutional value of
equality, it is hard to see how they are justified on that basis.  In other words, if
only “fighting words” are regulated, then it appears that the regulation is aimed
at preventing violence, not at vindicating the fundamental value of equality.  If
that is true, then either equality is merely a makeweight or the regulation’s fa-
cial justification (preventing violence or emotional injury resulting from face-to-
face insults) is a stalking horse for some other project, such as a comprehensive
rebalancing of equality and expressive liberties.  This is the concern that ani-
mates the civil libertarians.
Whether the classic civil libertarian position will continue to command the
respect of courts, as it did in cases like R.A.V.,244 or whether more courts and
government agencies will accept the invitation of the critics and decide cases on
a more explicitly evaluative basis, and so balance equality interests against ex-
241. Gellman, supra note 23, at 372.  See also DWORKIN, FL, supra note 132, at 220, 227-28 (noting
that pornography probably contributes substantially less to the subordination of women than television
and other mass media portrayals of women).
242. Delgado, Words, supra note 137, at 179.
243. Lawrence, supra note 12, at 450-54; Thomas C. Grey, Civil Rights v. Civil Liberties: The Case of
Discriminatory Verbal Harassment, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 81 (1991).
244. See also Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386, 392-93
(4th Cir. 1993).
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pressive liberties, is the question bequeathed to the new millennium by the hate
speech debate.  The answer to that question depends on some deeply contested
jurisprudential premises.  Progress on the hate speech debate can be made only
by keeping in mind the grounds for deeming a judicial decision legitimate—
whether a decision to restrict the asserted expressive freedom of someone like
Hale must be based solely in the text of the constitution and the intent of the
Founders, 245  constructive interpretation of the “scheme of principles” that gives
moral worth to our legal system, or whether judges should decide cases in a way
that properly expresses the relevant underlying moral values.246  In general, the
academic discussion of hate speech has avoided the armchair empiricism,
parade-of-horribles arguments, and accusations of racism or Big Brother-ism
that sometimes characterize the debate in the popular media, of which Henry
Louis Gates has said: “The strongest argument for regulating hate speech is the
unreflective stupidity of most of the arguments you hear on the other side.”247
The legacy of the hate-speech debate and the new left attack on the standard
civil libertarian picture, therefore, is a rich literature on constitutional
jurisprudence that may not provide a definitive answer in any given case, but
which at least points the way to a satisfying way to frame the conversation.  We
cannot ask for any more from theory.
245. DWORKIN, LE, supra note 110.
246. Pildes & Anderson, supra note 107.
247. Gates, supra note 176, at 18.
